




CENTRE FOR  
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
 
 
Development and social policy reform in 
Uganda: The slow emergence of a social 





Eduard Grebe and John Bosco Mubiru 
 
 
CSSR Working Paper No. 353 
 








Published by the Centre for Social Science Research 














ISBN: 978-1-77011-340-4  
 
© Centre for Social Science Research, UCT, 2014 
 
 






About the authors: 
 
Eduard Grebe is a Research Fellow in Centre for Social Science Research, University of 
Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa. Email: eduard.grebe@uct.ac.za. 
 
John Bosco Mubiru is a Senior Researcher for the Development Research and Training, 
Kampala, Uganda and Research Associate for the Centre for Social Science Research, 




The authors contributed equally to the conceptualisation of, research for and writing of the 
paper. Interviews with key informants were conducted by Eduard Grebe during early 2014 
and the paper was written in late 2014. The joint paper is partly based on two previous 
conference papers by Grebe on agenda-setting on cash transfers and Mubiru on increasing 
political support for cash transfers, respectively. The authors would further like to 
acknowledge the contribution of Prof Jeremy Seekings, who helped conceptualise the paper 
and provided tremendously useful comments on various drafts. We are grateful for funding 
for the LIWPR research programme from the UK Department for International Development, 
through the Economic and Social Research Council, through their Joint Fund for Poverty 
Alleviation. John Bosco Mubiru was not remunerated for his contribution to this research.
1 
 
Development and social policy reform 
in Uganda: The slow emergence of a 






This paper provides a broad overview of the evolution of development and welfare 
policy—and the politics surrounding—it in Uganda, but focuses primarily on the 
increasing prominence of social protection, especially cash transfers, on the 
domestic political agenda. It analyses both how and why the development and 
social policy agendas almost fully excluded social protection prior to 2002, but 
then increasingly embraced it, especially since 2006. Non-contributory social 
assistance in the form of cash transfers have not traditionally played a significant 
role in Ugandan development and poverty reduction policy, with policymakers 
tending to focus on economic growth as a source of prosperity (expected to extend 
to all sections of society), with opponents seeing cash transfers (and social 
assistance more broadly) as unaffordable and counter-productive ‘hand-outs’ 
that create dependence on the state and disincentivise productive work. From the 
early 2000s donors, sections of the bureaucracy and civil society promoted cash 
transfers with limited success. But after 2006, systematic promotion of cash 
transfers started to bear fruit, and from 2010 a largely donor-funded cash transfer 
pilot scheme known as the Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) 
programme has been implemented in fourteen districts (with a fifteenth added in 
2013). The paper describes the evolution of Ugandan development policy and 
highlight the political factors that have in the past been obstacles to social 
protection programmes featuring prominently on the development agenda 
(including the predominant socio-economic development paradigm, negative elite 
attitudes, resistance from conservative technocrats and lack of familiarity among 
key decision-makers) and examine how these have increasingly been overcome by 
the proponents of social protection. While donors have played a critical role in 
the promotion of social protection and cash transfers, other actors—including 
civil society and social development bureaucrats—and macropolitical factors 
(including electoral competition, changing international development discourse, 
emerging evidence from other countries, etc.), have also contributed to increased 
domestic political support. We conclude that the very existence of SAGE and the 
politics surrounding the pilot indicate a significant change in attitudes among a 
large proportion of policy-makers, including some historically sceptical 
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technocrats, and political leaders, but that resistance is likely to continue from 





Uganda is a low-income country (GNI per capita US$4801 in 2012), but has made 
significant developmental strides over the last decades. In particular it has 
sustained high levels of economic growth, among the highest in Africa,2 and the 
proportion of the population living in poverty has halved since 1992, although 
inequality has increased.3 (The character of poverty is discussed in more detail in 
the next section.) The Museveni government has also invested in social services, 
particularly health and education, and its approach is seen as relatively pro-poor 
(Melo et al., 2013). 
 
The rest of this paper addresses how development and social policy evolved in 
Uganda since 1986 (but focusing on the mid-1990s onwards, since it was during 
this period that poverty became a central policy concern) in an attempt to explain 
why social protection initially faced strong resistance, but was at first slowly and 
then increasingly rapidly embraced since 2002. A strong indication of this slow 
uptake of social protection incorporating cash transfers is the absence of 
significant social assistance schemes prior to the implementation of Social 
Assistance Grants for Employment (SAGE) in 2010.  
 
The paper is divided into four major parts. The first provides background by 
briefly describing the changing character of poverty in Uganda, including 
substantial decreases in absolute poverty (enabled by strong economic growth), 
but continuing high levels of vulnerability. The second reviews the history and 
politics of development policy as it pertains to social protection in the period 
1986-2006. During the latter part of this period cash transfers started to appear on 
the policy agenda, but did not translate into programmatic reform. The third part 
describes the increase in prominence of social protection and cash transfers on the 
policy agenda in the period 2006-2013, and the increase in political support, 
                                           
1 GNI per capita (Atlas method) for 2012 in current US$ (World Bank, 2014). 
2 Average annual real GDP growth was 6.9% in 1990-1999 and 7.2% in 2000-2009. (Growth 
rates have since declined.) This compares to 2.1% and 5.1% respectively for all low-income 
countries (World Bank 2014). Also see MFPED (2013), which cites average real GDP growth 
of 7% between 2000 and 2012. 
3 The proportion of the population living beneath the poverty line was 56% in 1992/93 and 25% 
in 2009/2010. This represents an absolute decline of the population in poverty from 10 million 
to 7.5 million. The proportion of the population classified as non-poor but insecure had, 
however, increased from 33% to 43% over the same period and the Gini coefficient from 0.37 
to 0.43 (MFPED, 2012: ix). 
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particularly since 2006, culminating in the implementation of SAGE from 2010 
onwards, which in itself contributed to increasing domestic political support. The 
fourth part of the paper addresses the question of why political support for social 
protection and cash transfers have increased, and identifies a range of factors that 
may help explain this. These include the promotion activities of donors, 
bureaucrats and civil society, but also the evolving discourse around social 
protection and how this resonated with sections of the Ugandan political and 
policy elite. Throughout we aim to identify the political factors that may help 
explain the initially very low, but later rapidly increasing domestic political 
support for expanded social protection in the form of cash transfers. In the 
concluding section we review the most important explanatory factors and identify 
areas for further research. 
 
Competing policy discourses persist, however, and policy contestation takes place 
within the context of a global trend of increased interest in and support for social 
protection. The end of the ‘poverty eradication era’ (approximately 1995-2002) 
coincided with a renewed emphasis in the development policy discourse on 
‘growth and prosperity’ (Hickey, 2012) and, somewhat paradoxically, social 
assistance. These processes are therefore neither simple linear developments nor 
easy to explain. 
 
The main contribution of the paper is to suggest a number of potentially crucial 
political factors that may have driven the rise of the social protection agenda in 
Uganda. These deserve further research, not only to determine which factors have 
the greatest explanatory power, but also as part of comparative studies of the 
politics of social protection in East Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa more broadly. 
 
 
2. Background: Poverty and vulnerability in 
Uganda 
 
Uganda’s economic progress is demonstrated by the fact that the proportion of the 
population living beneath the poverty line reduced from 56.4% in 1992/93 to 
24.5% in 2009/2010 (MFPED, 2012). This represents an absolute decline of the 
population living in poverty from 9.9 million to 7.5 million. This data comes from 
the Integrated Household Survey 1992/93, and the Uganda National Household 
Surveys 1999/2000-2009/10 (MFPED, 2012). Further reductions were registered 
in the 2012/13 Uganda National Household Survey (UNHS). However, more than 
6.8 million Ugandans still lived in extreme poverty  (i.e. unable to meet their basic 
minimum living requirements) at the time of the 2012/13 UNHS (UBoS, 2013; 
MFPED, 2014) and an additional 43% of the population (13 million people) were 
reported in 2012 as living barely above the poverty line and vulnerable to falling 
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into extreme poverty in the event of any shock to their income, such as ill health, 
disability, death of family member or climate-related risks (MFPED, 2012). The 
proportion of the population classified as non-poor but insecure increased from 
33.4% to 42.9% over the period 1992/93 to 2009/10. Income inequality also 
increased, with the Gini coefficient rising from 0.365 to 0.426 over the same 
period (MFPED, 2012: ix), but more recently decreasing to 0.395 in 2012/13. 
There had been notable reductions in income inequality in the central, eastern and 
western regions while there was an increase in income inequality in the northern 
region of Uganda (UBoS, 2013). 
 
Poverty reductions in Uganda have generally been attributed to economic growth 
and development and significant public investment in physical infrastructure as 
well as some targeted poverty interventions (MFPED, 2014). Nevertheless, many 
Ugandans still experience hunger, malnutrition and have limited access to health 
and education services. Poverty rates remains highest in Northern Uganda (44%) 
and lowest in the Central Region (4.7%). At the sub-regional level, 75% of the 
people in the North-East (Karamoja) experience income poverty, followed by 
West Nile (42%) and the Mid-North (36%). The high rates of poverty in northern 
and North-Eastern Uganda is partly explained by the instability and armed conflict 
that engulfed those regions in the 1980s and 1990s. The incidence of poverty in 
these regions is much higher than the national average (UBoS, 2013). Rural 
households are more vulnerable to falling into poverty than urban households. 
The drivers of vulnerability in Uganda include climatic shocks (drought, irregular 
rains, or floods), ill health, crop or livestock diseases, and physical insecurity—
conflict, violence, or theft (MFPED, 2014). According to the Ministry of Gender, 
Labour and Social Development, Uganda’s impressive growth over the past 20 
years has been unequal, disproportionally benefiting urban areas and the central 
and western regions, and benefiting the wealthiest more than the poor (MGLSD, 
2012a).  
 
Several categories of people are disproportionately vulnerable to poverty in 
Uganda. Older persons (variously defined as those over the age of 60 or 65 
years—60 for the purposes of the UNHS—see UBoS, 2013). Households with 
older persons as members are 32 % more likely to live in poverty than households 
without older people and over 70% of such households remain highly vulnerable 
to falling below the poverty line with even a small shock to income (MGLSD, 
2012a). According to the most recent UNHS, the absolute number of older 
persons has increased from about 1.3 million to 1.6 million over a period of three 
years (2009/10—2012/13), and by 2012/13 constituted about five percent of the 
population of Uganda. In addition, 75% of the older persons were heads of 




The vulnerability of older persons and their families is further demonstrated by 
the fact that the households that slipped into poverty between the 2005/6 and 
2009/10 national household surveys were also those that registered the greatest 
increases in old age dependency ratios (Namuddu et al., 2014). Older persons bear 
the greatest burden in terms of caring for orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs), 
with over 60% of OVCs being cared for by older persons according to the 
MGLSD’s OVC Situation Analysis Report 2009/10 (MGLSD, 2010). It is also 
reported that over 93% of older persons in Uganda are not in receipt of a pension 
or any form of income security (ESP, undated). This leaves this category of the 
population extremely and disproportionately vulnerable to poverty. 
 
The Social Development Sector Strategic Investment Plan 2011/12-2015/16 
(SDIP 2) indicates that in Uganda, widows who are elderly tend to be poorer 
because they do not control physical and financial resources (MGLSD, 2011b). 
The majority of older persons live in rural areas where about 85% of active older 
persons are engaged in crop farming. The Plan cites the UNHS 2009/10 (UboS, 
2010) as indicating that only 7.1% of older persons currently have access to 
pensions, of whom 60% are males. This means that 92.9% require social 
protection measures to enable them cope with vulnerability (MGLSD, 2011b). It 
further reports that existing social protection interventions are not focused on the 
chronically poor: cash for work programmes (see discussion later) are not 
appropriate for households with minimal labour capacity while the social 
insurance institutions which are focused on formal sector workers are not intended 
to reach the extreme poor, whose livelihoods come from informal and agricultural 
activities. In addition, anti-poverty programmes supporting income generation 
activities are largely focused on the moderately poor with work capacity, or on 
emergency and post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction (see discussion on 
interventions in Northern Uganda later). The majority of Ugandans are not 
covered by any formal social protection system, and the existing social insurance 
mechanisms (civil service pensions and National Social Security Fund—also 
discussed later) only reach those in formal employment. 
 
According to the UNHS 2012/13 (UBoS, 2013), children below the age of 18 
years constitute 58% of the population in Uganda. The MGLSD is mandated to 
promote social protection of poor and vulnerable children (such as orphans, street 
children, those under exploitative conditions of labour and those that suffer sexual 
abuse and other forms of discrimination). According to the Situation Analysis of 
Child Poverty and Deprivation report (Batana et al., 2014), child poverty has 
reduced significantly in the last ten years. However, 55% of children aged 0-4 
years live in poverty and 24% live in extreme poverty. In addition, 38% of 
children aged 6 to 17 years live in poverty and 18% in extreme poverty. The same 
report indicates that child poverty rates are much higher in Northern Uganda, with 
the lowest rates in Central and Eastern regions.  There are also regional disparities 
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with child poverty being much higher in rural areas than urban areas (Batana et 
al., 2014).4 The poverty and vulnerability situation among the children in Uganda 
is worsened by inadequate staffing and poorly funded national social welfare 
services (MGLSD, 2011a). The OVC Situational Analysis Report of 2009/10 
(MGLSD, 2010) attributes the high level of child vulnerability to general poverty, 
internal conflicts in some parts of the country and the impact of HIV/AIDS.  
 
Persons with disabilities (PWDs) are a further category of persons that are 
considered especially vulnerable to poverty. This vulnerability is attributed to 
their impairment and negative societal attitudes arising from fear, ignorance, 
superstitions, neglect and lack of awareness (MGLSD, 2009). According to the 
Poverty, Vulnerability and Inequality Report, households with at least one 
severely or partially disabled member are more likely to be poor, with poverty 
rates of 29.7% compared to 23.5% for those without such members (Wylde et al., 
2012). 
 
The need for non-contributory social assistance to vulnerable groups (most 
particularly older persons) therefore seems clear—and has in recent years been 
increasingly recognised among policy-makers and politicians. However, for most 
of the period since the Museveni/NRM government took power in 1986 welfare 
policy has been limited in scope, and social protection largely limited to social 
security for formal sector employees (public sector pensions and the National 
Social Security Fund for private sector employees). Public assistance to the 
vulnerable was largely restricted to agricultural livelihoods support and limited 
welfare interventions (see next section). 
 
From 2010, however, the Ugandan government has been implementing a cash 
transfer pilot scheme known as the ‘Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment’ 
(SAGE) in fourteen districts (in 2013 expanded to a fifteenth). It comprises a 
social pension available to all persons over 65 years of age (and those over 60 
years in Karamoja) known as the Senior Citizen Grant, as well as a poverty-
targeted grant (Vulnerable Families Grant) aimed at the most vulnerable 15% of 
families in the pilot districts. SAGE is the first significant cash transfer 
programme in Uganda and is being funded primarily by donors (DFID, IrishAid, 
and UNICEF) and administered by a dedicated secretariat (the Social Protection 
Secretariat in the MGLSD), which receives substantial technical assistance and 
capacity-building support from donors. The programme was initiated and 
promoted by donors, but has been embraced enthusiastically by sections of the 
Ugandan bureaucratic and political elite while facing scepticism and resistance 
from others (see Grebe, 2014a). It forms part of the broader ‘Expanding Social 
Protection’ programme aimed at ‘embedding a social protection system’ in 
                                           
4 The analysis in the report was based on the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey 2011. 
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Uganda and building domestic political support for social protection and cash 
transfers in particular. Since the implementation of SAGE, a domestically-funded 
universal social pension has also emerged prominently on the policy and political 
agenda, and is being seriously debated in policy and political circles, as well as 
publicly. It has even become an election issue. 
 
 
3. Ugandan development policy (1986-2006) 
 
3.1 Stabilisation, growth and state-building after 
Museveni takes power (1986-1995) 
 
Given the recent end of the bush war and general state of collapse, the policy focus 
during the initial years of the Museveni regime was on re-establishing order and 
security, state-building and economic stabilisation. These were prerequisites of 
exercising effective governmental authority (and retaining power) as well as of 
the success of any developmental interventions. 
 
Initially, a lack of consensus about macroeconomic policy (particularly the choice 
of an open versus a closed economy) resulted in some policy confusion 
(Kasekende and Atingi-Ego, 2008: 255), but after a number of failed 
interventionist attempts at stabilisation, a package of structural adjustment 
reforms was agreed with the IMF in 1987. This resulted in a range of liberal 
reforms in agricultural and input prices, the exchange rate, and more disciplined 
fiscal policy. Economic policy reforms were accompanied by institutional reform, 
including the merger of the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Development to form the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development (MFPED), and the introduction of annual Medium Term 
Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs) covering three financial years and aimed at 
ensuring improved fiscal discipline through ‘hard budget constraints’. Uganda 
was one of the first developing countries to introduce MTEFs and its system is 
among the most highly regarded (Whitworth and Williamson, 2011: 16). 
 
There existed some recognition that these reforms were having unintended 
negative consequences for some categories of poor people. As a result, some 
efforts were made to ameliorate the impacts, including the Programme for the 
Alleviation of the Social Costs of Adjustments (PAPSCA), which aimed to 
provide services in areas where those worst-affected by the reforms were living, 
as well as targeted credit programmes, such as the Rural Framers Credit 
Programme and Seed-capital (etandikwa), for groups and individuals with skills 




Uganda sustained relatively high levels of economic growth, with average annual 
GDP growth of 6.9% between 1990 and 1999 (World Bank, 2014). The Museveni 
government gained a reputation for good governance, low levels of corruption 
(although reputation doesn’t necessarily reflect reality), and good management of 
the economy, consequently attracting high levels of foreign aid.5 Its policies have 
been widely described as pro-poor (Mosley, 2012, Melo et al., 2013). Growth and 
macroeconomic stability created fiscal space for increased investment in human 
capital development after the mid-1990s whilst donors were at the same time 
moving towards a focus on poverty eradication (reflected especially in the World 
Bank and IMF’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and Highly Indebted Poor 
Country debt relief processes referred to below).  
 
For most of the post-colonial period, Uganda’s developmental trajectory was 
largely a continuation of the approach of late colonial British policy, described by 
Seekings (2013) as ‘developing’ African economies through ‘rather ineffective 
“developmental states” focused primarily on agricultural development’. In the 
first decades after Ugandan independence, development policy continued to focus 
on agricultural development in the countryside (Mamdani, 1976) with what 
Ferguson (2012) calls ‘strategies of restoring and developing peasant agriculture 
[that] were tightly bound up with fantasies of a communal and caring rural society 
that had to be restored’. Care for and assistance to the poor therefore continued to 
be seen as the responsibility of kin and community, best supported by improving 
rural livelihoods. In contrast to Southern African British colonies (especially the 
‘settler colonies’) no ‘poor law’ tradition existed in Uganda, and the relatively 
fertile soil and predictable rainfall obviated the need for regular large-scale food 
aid and input subsidies on the scale of those provided in countries like Malawi. 
 
Direct public assistance to the poor and vulnerable did not feature prominently in 
the development discourse of the post-1986 period. Rather, support for 
agricultural livelihoods (agricultural modernisation) and growth-oriented 
investment (state investment facilitating private-sector growth—investment in 
roads and other infrastructure was seen as necessary for the latter, for example) 





                                           
5 In recent years, corruption has become more of a concern and in November 2012 the donor 
community instituted a suspension of aid in response to an audit report detailing serious 




3.2 The ‘poverty eradication era’ (1995-2002) 
 
For most of the period since Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA)6 
took power in 1986, Uganda has pursued a market-friendly and growth-oriented 
development policy (and continues to do so). The mid-1990s to the early/mid-
2000s is often referred to as ‘the poverty eradication era’, when poverty featured 
centrally in development thinking. During this period the Poverty Eradication 
Action Plan (PEAP) of 1997 (MFPED, 1997) placed poverty reduction at the core 
of Ugandan development policy (see below), and the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) process made poverty reduction strategies a condition of debt relief 
under the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative of the World Bank and 
IMF. The PRSP process replaced structural adjustment programmes in many 
cases—including Uganda—as the World Bank and IMF’s primary agreements 
with governments on addressing ‘development’. 
 
It has been suggested that domestic politics also drove the new focus on poverty, 
with the campaigns for the Constituent Assembly elections of April 1994 and the 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections of May and June 1996 regarded as 
important events. In these elections, it is argued, politicians came face to face with 
the reality of rural poverty—many people who came for the campaign meetings 
used the slogan ‘although we sleep peacefully we cannot eat peace!’ A landmark 
event occurred in September 1996, when President Museveni mobilised Members 
of Parliament, donors and government ministers, taking them to the Luwero 
triangle. The Luwero triangle in central Uganda was the place where Museveni 
had launched his victorious guerrilla war. The President said the trip was to bring 
donors and politicians face to face with the state of roads, schools, dispensaries, 
and the extent of poverty in the countryside (Ssewakiryanga, undated). 
 
But social assistance and ‘social safety nets’ remained very marginal as potential 
anti-poverty measures. Some later described the PEAP as ‘social development-
friendly’ because it stressed the need for interventions in health, education, water, 
and sanitation, and emphasised social development as a priority action for 
reducing poverty and vulnerability (DRT, 2006). During this period, high 
economic growth rates continued,7 creating the fiscal space for increased social 
expenditure, as mentioned above, but the expenditure was primarily focused on 
human capital development (investments in health and education, etc.). 
 
                                           
6 The National Resistance Army would soon after be renamed the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM), which has remained in power continuously, including after the 
reintroduction of multiparty parliamentary elections. 
7 Average annual real GDP growth was 6.9% in 1990-1999 and 7.2% in 2000-2009. (Growth 
rates have since declined.) This compares to 2.1% and 5.1%, respectively, for all low-income 
countries over the same periods (World Bank, 2014). 
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Uganda invested substantial resources in social services like health and education 
(Hickey, 2012), introducing universal primary education in 1997 (Nishimura et 
al., 2008) and abolishing user fees for health services in public-sector facilities in 
2001, with a marked increase in utilisation (Nabyonga et al., 2005). 
Unfortunately, increased public expenditure did not necessarily result in 
commensurate improvements in service delivery (Reinikka, 2001)—the quality of 
education may have declined as enrolments increased (Deininger, 2003; 
Robichaud et al., 2014), education budgets stagnated in recent years (Robichaud 
et al., 2014), and out-of-pocket expenditures on health remained high (Orem et 
al., 2011). 
 
During the ‘poverty eradication era’ public assistance to the vulnerable remained 
largely restricted to agricultural advisory services (the National Agricultural 
Advisory Services, or NAADs), district-level social development services 
(including OVC programmes that are largely donor-driven, probation, and social 
welfare services), a small number of ‘social safety nets’ in the form of school 
feeding schemes, a district-administered grant to organised disability groups (the 
Special Grant for Disabled Persons), and a recently-launched Youth Livelihoods 
Programme for organised youth groups. Reconstruction and recovery 
programmes have been in place in Northern Uganda since the early 2000s, such 
as the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF), financed by the World 
Bank8 and the Northern Uganda Agricultural Livelihoods Recovery Programme 
(ALREP) and Karamoja Livelihoods Programme (KALIP), both financed by the 
European Union. These have included some social protection elements (like 
public works, ‘cash for work’ youth schemes, and Village Savings and Loans 
Associations), but are mainly restricted to the economically active and aimed at 
stimulating productive activity (discussed in greater detail later in this paper). 
 
The PEAP of 1997 did, however, signal a significant shift in Ugandan 
development discourse, as argued above: it placed poverty at the core of 
development policy. According to Mugambe (2011: 158) it had its roots in both 
public frustration over the failure of economic growth to significantly reduce 
poverty (widely aired during the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections), 
and international pressure to address poverty more comprehensively (articulated 
forcefully at a 1995 donor conference in Paris). A National Task Force on Poverty 
Eradication was assembled under the leadership of the MFPED which led a 
                                           
8 The World Bank’s initial efforts to promote social protection in Uganda started in 2002 via 
training workshops on social risk management, which influenced DFID’s then-Social 
Development Advisor (discussed later in greater detail). After attending one of the workshops, 
the Advisor devised a strategy of influencing the Government of Uganda’s policy on social 
protection via establishment of a Social Protection Task Force within the Ministry of Gender, 
Labour and Social Development (Hickey et al., 2009). More recently the World Bank has 
started promoting a social protection strategy across the continent (World Bank, 2012). 
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consultative process involving government, donors and civil society. The final 
PEAP was adopted by Cabinet in 1997 (MFPED, 1997). 
 
The PEAP was intended to serve as a guide to the formulation of government 
policy (complemented by specific sector investment plans) and signalled a clear 
shift towards poverty reduction, rather than economic growth, as the overarching 
policy goal. However, the ‘pillars’ and ‘priority service delivery areas’ articulated 
in the Plan made clear that livelihoods and income-generating opportunities 
remained the central mechanism for poverty alleviation. While the Plan did not 
contemplate any extensive social protection and made no reference to cash 
transfers, social service delivery (including education and health) featured 
prominently. The inclusion of Universal Primary Education (UPE) in the Plan 
followed Museveni’s pledge of free primary education during the 1996 
Presidential election campaign.  
 
Real efforts were made in the wake of PEAP’s adoption to align expenditure to 
both its specific goals and poverty issues more broadly in the budget process, 
evident particularly during a review of the Public Investment Plan undertaken in 
1998, although many poverty-focused projects were identified but left unfunded 
(Kakande, 2011: 227). However, while poverty reduction had become the primary 
objective of development policy, the means of achieving this goal remained 
contested, and social protection had not really entered the development policy 
agenda. Directly raising living standards through improved social services had 
gained in prominence, but the PEAP still primarily reflected the ‘trickle down’ 
model of poverty reduction as opposed to one founded on direct assistance to the 
poor.  
 
The PEAP was revised several times, and these revisions featured more extensive 
civil society participation than the initial drafting (Mugambe, 2011: 161) as well 
as an attempt to consult the poor through the Participatory Poverty Assessment 
process and to draw on a stronger evidence base in the form of the Poverty Status 
Report published in 1999 (MFPED, 1999). The first PEAP revision was 
recognised by the World Bank and IMF as Uganda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) in 2000—a requirement of debt relief under the Highly Indebted 
Poor Country (HIPC) initiative—and is now widely seen as a model for PRSPs. 
 
Until the third revision of PEAP in 2004 (described in the next section), even 
‘social safety nets’ received little consideration in poverty reduction and 
development planning during this period; social assistance largely remained at the 





3.3 Agenda-setting on cash transfers and livelihoods 
programmes in Northern Uganda (2002-2006) 
 
Social protection was almost entirely absent from the first two PEAPs, but it at 
least attracted some mentions in the second revision of the PEAP, produced in 
2004. It recognised social protection as a cross-cutting issue to help address risks 
and vulnerabilities and to prevent the poor and vulnerable from sinking into 
deeper poverty (MFPED, 2004). Hickey et al. (2009: 64) argue that the overall 
politics of the PEAP process at the time was characterised by strong MFPED 
resistance to social protection, which viewed it as unaffordable and preferred both 
the ‘productive potential of broad-based investments in human capital via health 




3.3.1 The Northern Uganda Social Action Funds and 
Labour-Intensive Public Works 
 
World Bank and European Union reconstruction and recovery programmes in 
Northern Uganda included some social protection elements (public works, ‘cash 
for work’ youth schemes, and Village Savings and Loans Associations), but were 
mainly targeted at the economically active and aimed at stimulating productive 
activity. These programmes nevertheless were significant, with large sums 
expended in the World Bank-financed Northern Uganda Social Action Fund 
(NUSAF)—which was later renewed—and EU-funded Northern Uganda 
Agricultural Livelihoods Recovery Programme. The interventions aimed at 
Northern Uganda—forming part of a broader Northern Uganda Reconstruction 
Programme (OPM, 2010)—were implemented in the aftermath of decades of 
disruption caused by conflict, collapsing state infrastructure, and were in part 
occasioned by the more precarious nature of agricultural livelihoods in this region. 
They were generally seen (and treated) as exceptional, existing outside broader 
social protection policy. Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey report: 
 
‘Importantly, there was also a strong sense that previous efforts to 
promote peace, development and reconstruction in northern Uganda 
had failed and were in need of renewal. It was in this context that 
NUSAF was announced amidst much official fanfare in 2002 as the 
main poverty reduction initiative for the north. The state-owned 
newspaper reported that “The Government has unveiled its strategic 
master plan on health, security, education, food and other areas of 
intervention to end the suffering in the insurgency-riddled northern 
Uganda”, and, coining a significant phrase, that “The Government has 
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initiated a US$100m project to ensure that the north catches up with the 
rest of the country in the development process”’ (2010: 1222). 
 
The first NUSAF, known as NUSAF I (funded to the tune of $133m) ran from 
2003 to 2009 and NUSAF II, with a budget of $100m, started in late 2010. The 
first NUSAF was funded primarily through an International Development 
Association (IDA) credit from the World Bank to the Government of Uganda and 
became effective in February 2003. Its objective was to empower communities in 
18 districts of Northern Uganda by enhancing their capacity to systematically 
identify, prioritise, and plan for their needs within their own value systems and 
ultimately, to improve economic livelihoods and social cohesion. NUSAF I had 
four components: (1) Community Development Initiatives, which provided 
health, education, transport, water and sanitation infrastructure to communities; 
(2) Community Reconciliation and Conflict Management, including training and 
activities to support peace building, traditional systems, and psychosocial 
programmes; (3) Vulnerable Groups Support, which provided a variety of group 
based interventions designed to reduce the vulnerability of especially poor and 
marginalised groups. Interventions included income generating activities, 
vocational training, life-skills training, cash support to families and food security, 
among others; and (4) The Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) which was 
added to NUSAF in 2005 (see Blattmann et al., 2009.)  
 
NUSAF I did therefore not include a public works component (McCord et al., 
2013), but NUSAF II, which started operating in 2010, did. NUSAF II was 
designed and agreed in 2009 jointly by the Government of Uganda, DFID and the 
World Bank. The main change from NUSAF I is the major shift in implementation 
modality, reflecting the challenge identified in a progress report, with the 
programme now being implemented directly by district authorities, rather than 
through parallel structures and a separate Management Unit (MU). The second 
major change was the addition of a public works programme (PWP) component. 
As a result, in addition to the institutional development component, NUSAF 2 has 
three, rather than two components targeted at the wider population, namely; (1) 
household inputs, (2) community infrastructure development using community 
labour (for example, houses for school teachers), and (3) public works 
employment and asset creation.  NUSAF 2 was designed to be implemented in 40 
of the 80 districts in existence in 2009 (which have subsequently increased to 
112), in what is sometimes known as ‘the Greater North’. It is financed by a $100 
million loan from the World Bank (McCord et al., 2013). These were not the first 
public works programmes in Uganda. As McCord et al. explain: 
 
‘There is a long history of Labour Intensive Public Works (LIPW) in 
Uganda, with community road maintenance programmes implemented 
from the 70s to the early 90s, after which road maintenance was 
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increasingly privatised and mechanised. During the decades of conflict 
food aid and humanitarian interventions dominated in the north, and 
little. Public Works activity took place, but during the 2000s multiple 
PWPs have been implemented in areas of Northern Uganda which were 
sufficiently peaceful, with agencies such as UNHCR using food-for-
work (FFW) approaches to develop the infrastructure required for 
distribution of relief items, including food. In recent years an increasing 
number of PWPs have been implemented with the objective either of 
relief or direct livelihood support, with PWP using food, cash or 
vouchers (redeemable for agricultural inputs) for work (FFW, CFW and 
VFW) replacing food aid for returnees; or infrastructure development 
for livelihoods reconstruction and recovery. However, most PWPs were 
small-scale and fragmented with considerable diversity of donors and 
implementing agencies. Currently, NUSAF 2 is the one large scale 
PWP being implemented in Northern Uganda, and there are three other 
major donor funded programmes which include some CFW, VFW or 
FFW elements (KALIP9, RALNUC210 and DAR11), and a number of 
other smaller programmes which entail PWPs, including the Local 
Government Road Maintenance programme which employs 
communities and adopts labour intensive road construction techniques 
and small-scale PWP interventions implemented by NGOs’ (2013: 5). 
 
 
3.3.2 ‘Social safety nets’ enter the policy agenda 
 
More relevant for our purposes is the history of proposals to extend ‘social safety 
nets’ and non-contributory social assistance aimed at reaching the poor and 
vulnerable. The major proponents of cash transfers in Uganda are social 
development bureaucrats within the MGLSD, NGOs working specifically with 
the poor and vulnerable (particularly the rural poor who rely on small-scale and 
subsistence agriculture), a small number of MFPED bureaucrats, a few politicians 
and, since the early-2000s, donors like United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DFID). It is notable that the World Bank—now 
primarily involved as a source of finance for reconstruction programmes in 
Northern Uganda—made early efforts to promote social protection in Uganda, 
starting in 2002 by means of training workshops on social risk management, 
which are reported to have influenced DFID’s then-Social Development Advisor. 
After attending one of the workshops, the Advisor devised a strategy of 
influencing the Government of Uganda’s policy on social protection via 
                                           
9 Karamoja Livelihoods Programme. 
10 Restoration of Agricultural Livelihoods in Northern Uganda Component. 
11 Development Assistance to Refugee Hosting Areas. 
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establishment of a Social Protection Task Force within the Ministry of Gender, 
Labour and Social Development (Hickey et al., 2009). This history of donor 
promotion of social protection is elaborated in greater detail in Grebe (2014a) and 
only a few key developments mentioned here. 
 
In 2002, the SPTF—chaired by the MGLSD and including representatives from 
the MFPED, Office of the Prime Minister, donors (most prominently DFID and 
the World Bank), and civil society—was established (ESP, 2013a). It identified a 
wide range of ‘micro-initiatives’ in existence, but noted that these operated in a 
policy vacuum and that demand for social protection vastly outstripped supply. It 
recommended a strengthened regulatory framework and a range of interventions 
from tax-financed minimum income guarantees to expanded compulsory 
contributory social security (Devereux et al., 2002).12 The history of the SPTF and 
its transformation into the Social Protection Sub-Committee in 2006 is recounted 
in Grant (2006) and Grebe (2014a). 
 
The first official government document to extensively treat social protection as a 
policy response to extreme and chronic poverty, the first Social Development 
Sector Strategic Investment Plan (SDIP) was also produced in 2002 (MGLSD, 
2003). In developing the SDIP cognisance was taken of the areas identified for 
attention in forthcoming PEAP revisions, especially social protection. In addition, 
the SDIP focused on processes and mechanisms to improve the policy framework, 
promote civil society and private sector involvement, increase resources, and, 
crucially, design and implement effective social protection programmes for the 
poor and vulnerable. The SDIP indicated that social protection is a multi-sectoral 
issue that requires action at different levels.  In the past, ‘social protection’ had 
been mainly associated with ‘safety nets’ targeted at chronically poor groups such 
as widows, orphans and people with disabilities.  In the SDIP, the concept of 
social protection was broadened to include areas of risk reduction and risk 
management. It recognised that for effective risk management social protection 
had to be ‘mainstreamed’ at a macro-policy level, within sector approaches as 
well as through targeted community-level programmes. The SDIP identified three 
areas for social protection interventions. These were (1) support to people in 
difficult circumstances; (2) community mobilisation and empowerment; and (3) 
promotion of employment and productivity. 
 
While even the SDIP largely reflected the prevailing emphasis on livelihoods and 
improved income-generation opportunities for the poor, it also called for a 
‘strengthened institutional and regulatory framework for social protection’ 
                                           
12 Interview, James Kabajo, MP (5 February 2014). 
12 Interview, James Kabajo, MP (5 February 2014). 
12 Interview, Isaac Arinaitwe (30 January 2014). 
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(MGLSD, 2003: 10). It further envisaged specific support and safety nets aimed 
at ‘people in difficult circumstances’, including such vulnerable groups as 
orphans, child labourers, people with disabilities, those affected by HIV and the 
elderly (MGLSD, 2003: 14). (A second iteration of SDIP—known as SDIP 2—
would be developed in 2012, in a more conducive political environment. See next 
section.) 
 
These developments appear to have represented an effort by donors, the MGLSD 
and civil society to place social protection on the development agenda, but with 
limited success and in the face of substantial resistance, especially from 
technocrats in the MFPED. It is reported (for example by Grant, 2006), that 
DFID’s spearheading of the process—and insufficient attention to building 
political support—contributed to the slow progress (also see Grebe, 2014a). 
 
There was an effort at mainstreaming social protection concerns into the PEAP. 
In 2002, one donor funded consultancy services to the Ministry of Gender, Labour 
and Social Development (MGLSD) to help it identify issues of risk and 
vulnerability. This work resulted in a report on risk and vulnerability in Uganda 
(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2002). A second phase was meant to identify 
social protection measures that might possibly contribute to addressing these 
issues of risk and vulnerability. As this work was meant to take place at the time 
of the PEAP Revision, its scope was changed accordingly. The consultants were 
asked to produce a social protection issues paper (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 
2003) to cover selected sectors and to engage with those sectors to see how issues 
of risk and vulnerability might be best addressed and what concrete social 
protection measures might be taken. When the sector papers and the draft PEAP 
were released, the same consultants were asked to assess to what extent social 
protection concerns were incorporated. The influence of this work on the PEAP 
revision process was judged as being less than satisfactory because of the absence 
of support from a strong local constituency, which was instead being led by a 
marginalised ministry and was too donor-driven (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 
2004). 
 
The ‘social safety net’ measures included in PEAP III (MFPED, 2004) were 
restricted in scope and for the most part were not envisaged to take the form of 
cash transfers. Examples included a school feeding programme, a commitment to 
implementing health insurance schemes, and measures targeted at specific 
vulnerable groups. However, few of the envisaged measures became policy or 
budgetary priorities after the publication of the Plan, with the school feeding 
programme never proceeding beyond a minor pilot, and most of the measures 
aimed at vulnerable groups contained in SDIP failing to be awarded a ‘Certificate 
of Financial Implication’ by MFPED and consequently receiving no budgetary 




Civil society voices around this time also started to call for an increased focus on 
social protection. The first Chronic Poverty Report of 2005 represented one of the 
earliest efforts by civil society to promote social protection as a core element of 
the development agenda, arguing that evidence from other low-income countries 
suggested that social protection measures were both desirable and affordable. It 
stated that: 
 
‘Policy has had relatively little to say about vulnerability … the time 
has come to consider rebalancing the effort on modernisation, 
entrepreneurship and human development with greater emphasis on 
security and protection’ (CPRC Uganda, 2005: 11). 
 
Even donors apart from DFID were not yet showing much interest in social 
protection (see, for example, ADB et al., 2005). The Ugandan government 
continued to exhibit a clear preference for the livelihoods-oriented ‘social action 
fund’ model in which disbursements are made to groups who exhibit 
entrepreneurial initiative. Examples include the Special Grant for Persons with 
Disabilities, which was paid over to districts—approximately USh 30m per 
district (NADC, 2012)—and at that level disbursed to organised groupings of 
disabled persons, who were encouraged to use the funds to establish income-
generating schemes like micro-credit associations and small-scale manufacturing 
operations. The underlying logic appears to have been that the assistance should 
help vulnerable people become self-sufficient and productive, rather than to 
directly support income and consumption. Perhaps the most significant example 
was NUSAF, which funded a large number of livelihoods projects (including 
agricultural revitalisation, small-scale infrastructure development and public 




3.4 Formal social security for a small minority 
 
Social protection in the form of social security for formal sector employees and 
retirees has existed for many years in Uganda. Civil servants and other 
government employees have had access to the state-administered Public Service 
Pension Scheme (PSPS), originally created in terms of the Pensions Act of 1946,13 
which in turn succeeded several colonial-era pensions ordinances. Formal social 
security in Uganda was introduced during the colonial era as a response to the 
social security needs of the expatriate workers. Msalangi (1998) reports that no 




social assistance scheme similar to those existing in Europe were introduced in 
the British colonies of Africa (see also Seekings, 2013). 
 
The structure of the current formal social security system reflects its colonial 
heritage, in part shown by the fact that the existing systems were not altered 
immediately after independence (Barya, 2009). There is also a Parliamentary 
Pension Scheme for the staff and Members of Parliament, providing them with 
pension and gratuity under the 2007 Parliamentary Act. The scheme is 
contributory in nature where beneficiaries contribute 15% of their pensionable 
emoluments while the government contributes 30% of the monthly pensionable 
emolument.  
 
The PSPS is a non-contributory and unfunded pension scheme, creating a 
substantial burden on the fiscus (Platform for Labour Action, 2008: 20). The 
scheme accounts for over 3% of the total government budget and in some years it 
increased to over 6% when backlogs of arrears were paid to beneficiaries (Huda 
et al., 2013). The state further administers and funds several pension schemes for 
members of the armed forces. A National Social Security Fund (NSSF), with 
compulsory contributions from employees of private sector companies employing 
five or more employees has been in existence since 1985.14 There are also several 
private or voluntary pension schemes in Uganda. These schemes are managed by 
employers and public institutions either on their own or through insurance 
companies. These include MTN Uganda Contributory Provident Fund, Monitor 
Publications Ltd. Staff Retirement Benefits Scheme, Makerere University 
Retirement Benefits scheme, Bank of Uganda Staff Retirement Scheme, among 
others.  These schemes were unregulated before the establishment of the Uganda 
Retirements Benefits Regulatory Authority (URBRA).15 The URBRA was 
established in terms of the URBRA Act (No. 15 of 2011). 
 
The Government of Uganda more recently proposed a Universal National Health 
Insurance scheme. Under the proposed National Health Insurance Bill, formal 
sector workers would pay 4% of their monthly earnings to the insurance scheme, 
which will be matched by a contribution equivalent to 4% of their earnings by 
their employers, while those in the informal sector would be mobilised under a 
savings scheme, where the same percentage of income would be contributed to 
health insurance (Mugerwa, 2013). The National Health Insurance Scheme Bill 
of 2007 has been shelved for over eight years. The scheme was expected to start 
in the financial year 2012/13 but was halted because of criticisms from major 
stakeholders, who described it as a further tax burden on employers; these 
                                           
14 The National Social Security Fund Act, Cap 222. See: 
http://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/consolidated-act/222. 




criticisms resulted from the fear that the policy might increase the already high 
costs of doing business in Uganda (Mugerwa, 2013).  
 
These formal social security schemes, which cover fewer than 10% of the working 
population (Kidimu, 2013), and the process initiated more recently to reform the 
social security sector, primarily by liberalising the private pension industry and 
the proposal for a national health insurance scheme, are not considered in any 
detail in this paper, since we focus on social assistance to the poor, particularly in 
the form of cash transfers. But the history of highly restricted formal social 
security systems may help to explain the lack of interest in social assistance 
among the elite and middle classes during this period. 
 
 
4. Cash transfers attract domestic political 
support and a pilot scheme is launched (2006-
2013) 
 
4.1 Initial moves to implement a cash transfer pilot 
 
From 2006, the SPTF decided to focus on cash transfers as the primary social 
protection mechanism it sought to promote (Hickey et al., 2009). A Memorandum 
of Understanding between DFID and the Government of Uganda to design and 
pilot a cash transfer scheme was signed in late 2006. 
 
In the latter part of 2006, the Social Protection Task Force was transformed into 
a Social Protection Sub-Committee of the Social Development Sector Working 
Group, with representation to the committee being broadened to include a cross-
section of civil society organisations, key sector ministries and donor 
representatives (Lwanga-Ntale, 2008). The Sub-Committee is the main leadership 
structure within the Government of Uganda on all social protection policy-related 
issues. The Sub-committee was therefore responsible for leading all social 
protection policy development, reform and coordination on behalf of the 
Government of Uganda. At the time of writing, the Sub-Committee membership 
comprised 40 individuals representing relevant Government of Uganda line 
Ministries, interested Development Partners, Civil Society Organisations, and 
Research Institutions. The ministries are represented at the Director and 
Commissioner levels. The Sub-Committee meets every quarter to discuss issues 
that the Ministry (latterly in the form of the Social Protection Secretariat) presents 
to them for guidance and approval. The Sub-committee has been broken down 
into four thematic groups: Capacity Building, Policy, Programmes, and 




The SPTF commissioned external consultants to design a cash transfer pilot 
scheme (with funding support from DFID), with DRT as the lead partner in the 
design team (which also included international consultants). It produced a 
comprehensive proposal, which was accepted and published by the SPTF in June 
2007 (MGLSD, 2007). Two of the proposed pilot’s primary aims would be to 
‘demonstrate the desirability and feasibility of such a scheme’ and to ‘win 
political support’ for cash transfers (MGLSD, 2007: vii). The team clearly sought 
to base the pilot design on sound evidence, as shown by the series of background 
papers (including a vulnerability assessment, review of international literature, 
and simulations/models to inform design choices), and also consulted with civil 
society and academia in the process.  
 
But it also clearly showed the influence of civil society groupings (particularly 
certain NGOs and the Ugandan research community) that were concerned 
primarily with ‘chronic poverty’ at the time. The terms of reference called for a 
‘cash transfer pilot scheme to address chronic poverty’ (our emphasis) and the 
design document extensively cited the first Chronic Poverty Report (CPRC 
Uganda, 2005). 
 
The international NGO HelpAge International worked with the Social Protection 
Task Force to convene a panel of experts to explore the possibility of 
incorporating a ‘categorical transfer’ component in the programme and to support 
the piloting of a social pension scheme within the framework, should such an 
option prove feasible. The African Expert Panel on Social Protection in Uganda 
was held in Kampala in March 2007. Panellists included representatives from the 
Governments of Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, and the United Kingdom, as well as 
experts from the South African Economic Policy Research Institute, International 
Labour Organization, Development Research and Training, Uganda Reach the 
Aged Association (a national NGO), and HelpAge International (UN, 2008). But 
a categorical transfer was not included in the final design. 
 
Despite the recognised need to win political support for cash transfers, the SPTF 
and their consultants appeared to underestimate the opposition even a pilot cash 
transfer might face. The document revealed little effort to present cash transfers 
as anything other than a mechanism to directly address poverty (other mechanisms 
being, for example, estimating the impact on the poverty gap of various options). 
 
The design envisaged targeting beneficiaries in the lowest decile of consumption 
expenditure and proposed a transfer of USh 18,000 per household (US$10.58 in 
June 2007) plus supplementary transfers of USh 2,000 for every child under 18, 
elderly person (60 and older) and person living with a disability in the household 
up to a maximum of five supplementary transfers. It proposed six pilot districts 
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selected on the basis of a multi-criterion ranking depending on the share of 
vulnerable people in the district population. It further proposed relatively complex 
eligibility criteria for individual households and a ranking procedure for selecting 
from eligible households. The proposed scheme included ‘soft conditionality’ in 
an attempt to establish links between the transfer and health, education and 
nutritional outcomes through ‘moral suasion’ and ‘opt-in incentives’ to meet a 
package of health and schooling commitments (MGLSD, 2007: 15-16). Payments 
would be made via post offices and parent/teacher associations. The pilot was 
expected to reach up to 9000 beneficiaries over four years and cost approximately 
US$7.7m—fully funded by DFID (MGLSD, 2007). 
 
But implementation of the SPTF proposal faced serious resistance from MFPED 
officials and the then-Minister of Finance, Dr Ezra Suruma, an economist by 
training, blocked implementation by refusing to issue the required ‘certificate of 
financial implication’, without which even donor-funded but government-
administered expenditure is impossible. The Minister’s stated concerns were 
related to the ‘affordability of the project over the long term and its donor-led 
character’ (Hickey et al., 2009: 65). See Grebe (2014a) for a fuller discussion of 
both this failed proposal and the response of donors (principally DFID) and 
supportive bureaucrats. This response principally consisted of devising a serious 
strategy for promoting cash transfers politically and eventually led to the design 
of a new pilot scheme, which became SAGE (discussed in the next section). 
 
Both financial technocrats and their political principals were aware that once 
implemented, even a pilot scheme would be difficult to roll back, potentially 
creating an open-ended financial commitment if donor support evaporated.16 But 
crucially, the SPTF and the designers of the pilot had simply not anticipated the 
level of resistance the plan would encounter and little groundwork had as yet been 
done to build awareness of and political support for it. 
 
After the failure of the first proposed cash transfer pilot to win political support, 
proponents of cash transfers (most significantly DFID and the MGLSD) had no 
choice but to set out on a well-planned agenda-setting and advocacy exercise (see 
Grebe, 2014a). It now saw building political support for cash transfers as of 
central importance and pursued this task vigorously.17 A senior DFID official and 
contracted consultant explained that DFID came to understand that merely 
offering funds for an initiative would not guarantee its acceptance, particularly 
when elite attitudes in general were not favourable to social protection and when 
                                           
16 Interview, Stephen Barrett (13 January 2014). 
17 Interview, Beatrice Okillan (13 January 2014). 
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financial technocrats and politicians were (rightly) concerned over creating long-
term liabilities.18 
 
Following the recommendations of the first Chronic Poverty Report (CPRC 
Uganda, 2005), the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development 
(MGLSD) had been involved in social protection debates, both at the national and 
international levels, and became an increasingly vocal supporter of cash transfers. 
Furthermore, since 2006 the MGLSD, working with the Social Protection Sub-
committee—successor to the SPTF—championed efforts to promote a 
coordinated approach to social protection in Uganda. These efforts and the 
debates culminated in the design of the Expanding Social Protection (ESP) 
Programme. Other factors that led to the approval of the SAGE pilot programme 
include donor and bureaucratic promotion, civil society promotion, and the 
evolving development policy discourse that emphasised growth, but also 
increasingly recognised social protection as a potentially feasible and desirable 
way of assisting those least likely to benefit from economic growth (see Section 
5). Donor and bureaucratic promotion of cash transfers are treated extensively in 
Grebe (2014a). 
 
More recently, social protection was strongly endorsed in national development 
policy through the National Development Plan of 2010. The most recent 
overarching planning documents are Vision 2040 (GoU, 2013) and the National 
Development Plan (GoU, 2010). The NDP replaced the PEAPs as the overall 
development coordinating policy of Uganda. Two features are striking: (1) the 
inclusion, for the first time, of social protection as a major policy priority in the 
primary development plan and (2) a renewed focus on growth, employment and 
private sector development. The latter is indicated by the ‘vision’ and ‘theme’ of 
the document: “a transformed Ugandan society from a peasant to a modern and 
prosperous country within 30 years” and “growth, employment and socio-
economic transformation for prosperity” (GoU, 2010: i). It has been argued that 
the NDP signals a turn away from the government’s previous focus on poverty 
eradication to a wider focus on ‘prosperity for all’ (CPAN, 2013: ix). We view 
this less as a move away from poverty eradication than as a resurgence of the 
discourse dominated by efforts at improved livelihood opportunities that privilege 
the ‘economically active poor’. This strand was never absent from the 
development policy discourse, but had been overshadowed by the poverty 
eradication discourse during the PEAP era. Somewhat paradoxically, however, 
this turn coincided with the strong endorsement of social protection. The NDP 
called for a comprehensive policy on social protection and the implementation of 
cash transfers (at least in pilot form). The Plan stated, among other things: 
 
                                           
18 Interviews, Stephen Barrett and Rachel Waterhouse (13 January 2014). 
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‘640. Social Protection: This entails all public and private interventions 
that address vulnerabilities associated with being or becoming poor. 
Social protection is a public investment in human capital that facilitates 
risk taking endeavours and also enables the poor to prevent, cope with 
and mitigate risks. These interventions currently include: provision of 
social assistance to the chronically poor; care for the elderly, Orphans 
and other Vulnerable Children (OVC); special needs education and 
training; community based rehabilitation services for PWDs; social 
security for public sector and formal private sector employees; pension 
for public sector employees and relief services to disaster victims. In 
addition, the Government has promoted equal opportunities, operation 
of social security schemes, labour standards and occupational safety. 
… 
666. objective 3 - Expand social protection measures to reduce 
vulnerability and enhance the productivity of the human resource.  
Strategy 1: Diversify and provide comprehensive social protection 
measures for the different categories of the population.  
Intervention Description: 
i)  Formulate a comprehensive social protection policy and 
strengthen  the mechanism for coordination of social protection 
programmes.   
ii)  Diversify social security measures to cover more people, those 
employed in the formal and informal sector as well as the 
unemployed.   
… 
vii)  Develop and implement social transfer programmes including 
cash  transfer programmes to the elderly, persons with disability 
and the poorest quartile of the population, and cash for work for 
the vulnerable youth’ (Our emphasis. GoU, 2010). 
 
This is indeed what has since transpired, as described below, with the formulation 
of a National Social Protection Policy Framework (MGLSD, 2013) within the 
MGLSD and the design and implementation of the SAGE scheme under the 
auspices of the broader ESP. 
 
A second iteration of the SDIP, the Social Development Sector Strategic 
Investment Plan 2011/12-2015/16 (SDIP 2) identified 5 interventions under social 
protection for vulnerable groups. These were: (1) Provision of social assistance 
for the chronically vulnerable; (2) Empowerment of vulnerable groups for 
improved livelihoods; (3) Provision of care and protection; (4) Promotion and 
Protection of Rights; and (5) Strengthening systems and structures for social 
protection (MGLSD, 2011b). Under the intervention (1), the SDIP 2 stated that 
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the social development sector would provide social assistance in the form of cash 
transfers to those deemed eligible on the basis of their vulnerability, disability, 
and old age to meet immediate needs. The sector would encourage informal 
schemes like individual or family support, community support groups or 
associations, self-help groups, and micro-insurance. In addition, the sector would 
advocate for preventive measures to avert poverty and reduce vulnerability and 
risks. Measures included food for-work schemes in food insecure regions, school 
feeding programmes for orphans, as well as measures to safeguard health, 
including drugs for older persons and antiretroviral treatment for persons 
suffering from AIDS (MGLSD, 2011b). 
 
These policy documents appear to illustrate a genuine emerging commitment to 
social protection as part of Uganda’s development agenda. 
 
 
4.2 Designing and winning support for the Social 
Assistance Grant for Empowerment (SAGE) scheme 
 
In 2009, DFID and IrishAid contracted Maxwell Stamp to commence the design 
of the ESP/SAGE programme. In a job posting Maxwell Stamp provided the 
following background: 
 
‘Maxwell Stamp was contracted by DFID and Irish Aid in 2009 to 
engage Government of Uganda, development partners, CSOs, and 
communities to redesign cash transfer pilot. The design team worked 
with the Directorate of Social Protection in the MGLSD and held 
several consultations in Kampala and initially in two pilot districts 
(Kyenjojo and Katakwi), followed by a further two districts in 
Karamoja (Moroto and Nakipiripirit) over the period of July to October 
2009. Options papers highlighting key design challenges and issues 
were presented to stakeholders at a workshop in Munyonyo in August 
following which, the Programme Memorandum for the Enhancing 
Social Protection in Uganda (ESPU) Programme was developed for 
DFID, and further design documentation for Irish Aid’ (Maxwell 
Stamp, 2010). 
 
As part of explicit efforts to secure political support, the proposal was taken 
directly to Cabinet. In a fortuitous development, Syda Bbumba, who had been 
Minister of Gender, Labour and Social Development from 2006 to 2008 (i.e. 
during the period when the first proposal of a pilot cash transfer had failed to win 
support), had shortly before been appointed Minister of Finance. Her presence on 
the Cabinet sub-committee established to evaluate the proposal, and the clout 
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inherent in her position, together with the fact that a number of senior MFPED 
officials (including a Minister of State19 in the MFPED, Fred Omach) were seen 
as sympathetic to cash transfers, have been cited as important factors in the 
proposed pilot winning support in Cabinet and obtaining the necessary clearance 
from the MFPED. DFID’s senior social development advisor, Rachel 
Waterhouse, described this as the single most important factor in the proposal’s 
success.20 
 
As described in the introduction, SAGE is a component of the Expanding Social 
Protection (ESP) Programme. The purpose of the 5-year ESP programme (2010-
2015), which was approved by Cabinet in 2010, is to embed a national social 
protection system including social assistance for the poorest and most vulnerable 
as a core element of Uganda’s planning and budgeting processes. The ESP 
programme adopts a holistic approach to embedding social protection through (1) 
the development of a national social protection policy and costed strategy; (2) 
institutional reform and capacity building within the MGLSD and across 
government as a whole; and (3) engagement with political actors to build 
understanding and commitment to social protection. These are supported by the 
SAGE pilot scheme which aims to generate evidence on the impact and feasibility 
of delivering small but regular and reliable direct income support to poor and 
vulnerable households (Namuddu et al., 2014). It is intended to directly reduce 
chronic poverty and improve life chances for the poor and vulnerable through the 
cash transfer pilot and to embed a national social protection system within 
Uganda’s national planning and budgeting system (Bukuluki and Watson, 2012). 
 
The implementation of the Expanding Social Protection (ESP) Programme started 
in June 2010. The programme is led by the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social 
Development (MGLSD) and supported financially by DFID, IrishAid, and 
receives technical support from UNICEF. The Government of Uganda is also 
supporting the programme with in-kind support in terms of personnel, office 
space, etc., to the value of USh 6 billion over the 5 years (ESP, 2013a). The donor 
funding originally committed ends in February 2015, but a December 2014 
newspaper article quoted the SP Secretariat’s Advocacy Advisor as saying 
“Development Partners have committed another USh 250 billion for Uganda’s 
Expanded Social Protection  Programme  over the next five years starting in the 
2015/16 financial year” (Namutebi, 2014). 
 
                                           
19 In Uganda, where terminology often mirrors the British system, Ministers of State are 
essentially deputy or junior ministers—i.e. they form part of the political leadership of the 
Ministry, while the administrative heads of Ministries managing the civil servants are known 
as Permanent Secretaries. 
20 Interview, Rachel Waterhouse (13 January 2014). 
26 
 
SAGE itself is a cash transfer scheme specifically targeted at labour-constrained 
individuals and households (people with increased vulnerability to poverty due to 
reduced ability in productive activity). SAGE currently comprises two 
mechanisms: (1) the Senior Citizen Grant (SCG) that is paid to older persons aged 
65 years of age and above (but 60 years in the case of the Karamoja region) and 
(2) the Vulnerable Family Grant (VFG) paid out to households with low labour 
capacity owing to age, physical disability, etc., and high dependency ratios. The 
SAGE initially covered 14 districts21 across the four country sub-regions, chosen 
according to an index based on share of specific demographic groups (children, 
the elderly, OVCs) as well as on health and education criteria. A fifteenth district 
(Yumbe) was added in 2013 at the direction of President Museveni and funded by 
the Government of Uganda, reportedly following a meeting between the President 
and the district’s leadership. A mix of socio-demographic and infrastructure proxy 
indicators22 based on the 2002 Uganda Population and Housing Census was used 
(OPM, EPRC and Neema, 2013). The probability of a pilot district being included 
in the SAGE pilot programme was dependent on the score index after summing 
up of all the proxies in a district. 
 
 
Source: Zimmerman and Bohling (2013)  
 
Figure 1: The SAGE Design and Implementation Process 
 
                                           
21 The 14 districts are Apac, Kaberamaido, Katakwi, Kiboga, Nebbi, Kyenjojo, Moroto, 
Nakapiripirit, Amudat, Kyegagwe, kyankwanzi, Zombo, Napak, and Kole. 
22 The proxy indicators were: share of children in the entire population, share of the elderly 
persons in the entire population, share of orphans and vulnerable children in the child 
population, share of risky births, proportion of households living more than 5 km from health 
facilities, and share of children (6-12 years) not attending school 
27 
 
A total of 108,135 beneficiaries had been enrolled by late 2014 with over 80% of 
the programme beneficiaries enrolled in the SCG component.  In total, the 
programme had benefited 550,000 people (Kasaija, 2014). Beneficiaries of both 
SCG and VFG receive USh 50,000 (approximately US$ 20) every two months 
and over USh 50 billion had been disbursed through the electronic delivery 
mechanism (MTN Mobile Money) by September 2014 (ESP, 2014). According 
to Namuddu et al. (2014), the Vulnerable Family Grant component of the SAGE 
pilot was scaled back in 2013 as a result of strong negative responses to the 
targeting mechanism from beneficiary communities and local leaders, as well as 
the higher than expected implementation costs associated with data collection for 
targeting. 
 
After a corruption scandal following an audit report that uncovered serious 
irregularities and misuse of funds in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM), 
financial arrangements for SAGE were changed. Until that time operational costs 
for SAGE were paid through MGLSD bank accounts and the responsible 
Community Development Officer (CDO) at district level. Since then, SAGE 
payments flow only through bank accounts controlled by Maxwell Stamp Plc.-
contracted staff. At district level, staff formerly hired by district administrations 
and financed by the programme, are now employed and managed directly by MSP 
(Cammack and Twinnamatisko, 2013). 
 
In 2011, the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Local Governments to prepare 
for the implementation of the Social Assistance Grant for Empowerment (SAGE). 
The MOUs specify the roles and expectations of the various stakeholders in 
SAGE implementation. They also streamline SAGE operations within the local 
government structures. The signing of MOUs represented the first step of 
collaboration with the Ministry of Local Governments and Expanding Social 
Protection (ESP) Programme (ESP, 2011). 
 
As mentioned earlier, this resurgence of the ‘prosperity agenda’ (reflected in the 
NDP and Vision 2040) coincided with the rise in prominence of social protection 
in general and cash transfers in particular. The latter has won strong backing 
within sections of the government—particularly the MGLSD—and from donors 
and civil society. It is important to note that social protection and poverty 
alleviation policy is rather fragmented in Uganda, with various (usually regional) 
development programmes including social protection components, varying from 
public works and ‘cash for work’ or ‘voucher for work’ schemes to in-kind 
transfers. There is limited coordination between these schemes (their design and 
specific mechanisms often driven by the preferences of particular donors), 
funding streams operating outside the mainstream budget and implemented by 
teams segregated from mainstream government structures (usually including 
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donor-nominated technical advisors and situated outside the relevant line 
ministries, such as in the Office of the Prime Minister). 
 
But attitudes have undeniable changed, as reflected in the change of heart of the 
Minister of Finance that blocked the first proposed pilot—Dr. Ezra Suruma. 
Recently, as Senior Presidential Advisor on Economic Affairs, he has expressed 
support for the SAGE grant. During a national dialogue hosted by ESP and the 
Economic Policy Research Centre, he said in his statement: 
 
‘Allow me to use this opportunity to support the establishment of a 
comprehensive national program for the assistance of people who are 
unable to earn an income. These include those Ugandans who at some 
point in their lives find themselves too young, too old or too disabled to 
look after themselves. I want to appeal to all Ugandans to recognize, 
accept and support a national program for the assistance of fellow 
Ugandans who at some point in their lives find themselves unable to 
earn an income that can afford them a standard of living that is 
considered worthy of a human being. Since we became independent, 
we have seen catastrophic fluctuations in political and economic 
stability. Fortunately, the last 25 years have recorded more economic 
growth and more political stability than the first 25 years of independent 
Uganda. As we grapple with the issues of economic growth and the 
distribution of that growth among Ugandans, we must also grapple with 
the problem of those in our society who cannot cope with the demands 
of earning an income’ (ESP, 2012). 
 
 
5. The politics of cash transfers in Uganda: 
from resistance to support 
 
Despite the extensive agenda-setting efforts and vigorous promotion of social 
protection and cash transfers (some already described, but also see below and 
Grebe, 2014a), the approval and largely on-schedule implementation of SAGE 
represents a considerable achievement in overcoming widespread scepticism and 
opposition. Uganda was slower than many similar low-income countries (notably 
their neighbour Kenya) to embrace cash transfers. 
 
As we have implicitly and explicitly argued throughout this paper, domestic 
politics is a key determinant of policy and programme responses to poverty in 
Uganda. This is in part demonstrated by the evolution of development policy 
described in the earlier section on development policy in Uganda. Politics plays 
out among domestic political actors, in domestic political institutions, and at the 
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global level—especially in state-donor relations and in the impact of global policy 
discourses and evidence from countries that have implemented cash transfer 
schemes (most prominently Brazil, but also other African countries). 
 
In the early 2000s, politics represented a serious obstacle to the implementation 
of social protection interventions in Uganda, particularly cash transfers. However, 
this started to change through the agenda-setting and advocacy efforts of donors 
and bureaucrats (see Grebe, 2014a). The transformation became especially clear 
after 2006, when domestic political support for social protection became 
significantly more pronounced. The failure to invest in social protection 
programmes in the past can be attributed to a set of political factors. These 
political factors shaped the context in which decision-making on assistance for 
the poorest took place, and if (as well as which) pro-poor policies would be 
adopted. Some of the most important political factors that impeded the earlier 
uptake of social protection and cash transfers are described below. 
 
 
5.1 Political impediments to social protection and 
cash transfers prior to 2006 
 
5.1.1 The predominant socio-economic paradigm 
(economic ideology) 
 
As was made clear earlier, the predominant view of development was based on an 
economic growth-centric model, especially among MFPED economists and 
technocrats, and apparently also within the Museveni regime’s ‘insiders’. This 
agenda was mostly centred on maintenance of macro-economic stability (with 
emphasis being on low inflation, fiscal responsibility, and an open economy), 
attracting direct foreign investment; investment in infrastructure (especially 
roads); and promotion of micro-credit and demand-driven agricultural expansion, 
emphasising higher value-added agricultural production and development of 
export-oriented and cash-crop driven commercial and smallholder agriculture.  
 
This growth agenda excluded a large proportion of the poorest Ugandans from 
development programmes (Lwanga-Ntale, 2008). Economists in the main 
believed that economic growth would reduce poverty and that the chronically poor 
were a residual group who, at most, needed temporary and specialised welfare 
programmes (essentially a version of the 1980s ‘trickle down’ model or so-called 
‘Washington Consensus’). Furthermore, politicians faced incentives to favour 
policies aimed at short-term gains. A key informant in the Ministry of Finance, 




‘economics is politics and politics is not long term. Politics only has 5 
years to deliver and therefore politicians are looking to make clear 
impacts and dealing with deeper poverty is perceived as less likely to 
show impacts quickly enough. If assistance is not likely to raise targeted 
beneficiaries above the poverty line quickly then the political benefits 
of prioritising these actions are not apparent’ (Grant, 2006: 19). 
 
This predominance of an economic growth agenda inhibited the allocation of 
resources aimed at assisting marginalised and vulnerable groups. 
 
In the second Chronic Poverty Report (CPAN, 2013), the slow embrace of social 
protection was blamed on a ‘political lethargy’ around social protection, which it 
attributed to: 
 
‘1) the dominant economic paradigm, which sees [social protection] as 
a cost, rather than an investment; 2) elite attitudes that blame the poor 
for their poverty and expect them to address it through behaviour 
change, that do not have confidence in government’s ability to run 
poverty-reducing programmes and that assert that social protection is 
unaffordable in Uganda; and 3) the weak administrative and 
institutional framework’ (CPAN, 2013: x). 
 
These same factors were cited by informants involved in the promotion of social 
protection in explaining the need to continue building political support. 
Informants were nearly unanimous in arguing that the Ugandan political and 
technocratic elites (outside the narrow social development circle) were slow to 
embrace social protection. But as described below, these attitudes began to 
change, especially after 2006.  
 
 
5.1.2 Negative elite attitudes 
 
Information from key informants and the limited existing literature (for example, 
CPRC Uganda, 2005; Grant, 2006) suggests that many members of the political 
and economic elites in Uganda, in addition to having a relatively homogeneous 
perspective on poverty, also tend to have negative views about social assistance 
programmes for the poorest. These included concerns about adverse incentives on 
the poor (such as disincentivising work), the misuse of ‘handouts’, ‘dependency’ 
among the poor, and over the affordability of such programmes.23 Elite members 
                                           
23 Key informants interviewed for this research were almost unanimous in attributing the slow 
acceptance of cash transfers to negative attitudes such as those described among the political, 
policy and economic elites. See also Grebe (2014a). 
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are apparently quick to apportion blame to the poor, in particular citing laziness, 
lack of innovation and poor attitudes towards work (Lwanga-Ntale, 2008). Social 
protection has also been described as a donor or western-driven agenda, 
unaffordable for Uganda. 
 
Two of the strongest examples of opposition to social assistance were (1) when 
the Minister of Finance blocked the implementation of the first proposed cash 
transfer pilot over ‘sustainability’ concerns (indicating negative attitudes among 
the political elite) and (2) later, when the Government of Uganda announced the 
plan for introducing the SAGE cash transfer pilot scheme, public opposition from 
members of the economic elite and sections of the technocracy (Lwanga-Ntale, 
2008). Another informant from the MFPED told Grant (2006) that many 
influential people were not sensitive to poverty issues, and would argue for 
different priorities—illustrated by this quote “the country is not only about 
vulnerable poor people; what about protecting those that have come out of 
poverty; no free cash to reward people for being poor; growth is key, everything 
else is secondary” (quoted in Grant, 2006). Our informants were significantly less 
likely to express these kinds of views in 2014. 
 
Furthermore, members of the elites held a belief that anti-poverty national 
programmes have predominately failed in Uganda, even though some would 
argue that moderate progress had been achieved on poverty reduction. The lack 
of faith in government action on poverty further contributed towards pushing the 
social protection agenda down the list of priorities (Lwanga-Ntale, 2008). Many 
informants interviewed for this research recalled that objections were frequently 
raised that beneficiaries would use cash to purchase alcohol or other non-
essentials and that grants would act as disincentives to work and would promote 
laziness and withdrawal from the workforce. An opinion survey on knowledge, 
attitudes and practices on poverty, vulnerability, social protection, and cash 
transfers in seven districts, including Kampala, found that 13% of respondents by 
2011 still felt that cash transfers would result in beneficiaries becoming ‘lazy’ 
(Synovate, 2011). Evidence gathered in the course of the fieldwork for this study 
supports these conclusions on continued resistance.24 Systematic evidence on elite 
attitudes is lacking, but appear to have changed significantly over the last decade. 
                                           
24 A workers’ representative in Parliament, for example, expressed support for and pride in the 
Senior Citizen Grant, but strongly opposed any cash transfers to other categories of the poor 
and vulnerable “because this would create dependency on the state” (interview, Rwakajara 
Arinaitwe, MP, 15 January 2014) and several other politicians expressed similar concerns over 
cash grants to the non-aged. A further telling anecdote recounted by a knowledgeable informant 
was that the Deputy Prime Minister made comments at the formal launch of SAGE entirely 
inimical to the spirit of the programme, including the comment that ‘the only solution to poverty 
is hard work and not government hand-outs’ (or words to that effect). (The informant asked for 
this account not to be attributed.) 
32 
 
5.1.3 Lack of familiarity with social protection and mixed 
signals from donors 
 
A genuine lack of knowledge on social assistance programmes and cash transfers 
in particular presented an obstacle to both political support for and the 
implementation of cash transfer schemes. 
 
A significant number of informants interviewed for this research indicated that 
rising awareness of social protection—and the evidence on its affordability and 
impacts in low income countries—contributed substantially to changing attitudes. 
There was limited knowledge on what social protection is, its benefits and how it 
is implemented, in addition to the lack of a policy framework to guide the 
implementation of programmes (Onapa, 2010).25 Furthermore, there existed a 
feeling that donors influencing the social protection agenda in Uganda (mainly 
DFID and World Bank) were giving mixed signals about social protection. The 
World Bank was guided by their social risk management (SRM) framework 
whereas DFID was guided by vulnerability and poverty frameworks (Grant, 
2006). These mixed signals probably presented an impediment to generating 
enthusiasm and political support for initiating any pilots as well more general 
development of the social protection agenda in Uganda. 
 
 
5.1.4 Intra-governmental institutional politics 
 
Rivalry, varying ideological frames and lack of communication, especially 
between the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED) 
and Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD), further acted 
as an impediment to the emergence of social protection on the development policy 
agenda. A point of contention was which ministry should take the lead on social 
protection. The MFPED was the more powerful institution (as is usually the case, 
given that it is responsible for resource allocation), while MGLSD had the official 
mandate to spearhead social development in the country. The biggest dispute 
between the two institutions centred on the former accusing the latter of having 
limited financial and technical capacity to implement social protection 
programmes (Onapa, 2010). There were concerns from stakeholders in the 
MFPED that the MGLSD was too weak to cope with the coordination role in 
social protection. Informants from the MFPED, referred to in Grant (2006), 
argued that the responsibility had to lie within an institution with real power such 
as the MFPED, the Office of Prime Minister or the President’s Office, if social 
protection was to be taken seriously in Uganda. This brought about debates as 
                                           




other stakeholders suggested building on the efforts of the MGLSD, and work 
with it rather than against it (Grant, 2006). This was worsened by the lack of a 
common understanding on social protection by the different ministers as 
exacerbated by the lack of a common understanding of social protection among 
various ministries (Grant, 2006). Hickey et al. further state that: 
 
‘The power relations at the centre of official policy processes are 
heavily skewed in favour of the powerful Ministry of Finance, whereas 
the social welfare ministry with responsibility for addressing 
vulnerability is relatively marginal and lacks significant administrative 
capacity’ (2009: 19). 
 
The politics of Social Protection in Uganda has largely revolved around financing 
and affordability of the schemes. Some politicians have always argued that 
financing social protection programmes from domestic resources will lead to 
redirecting funds from other areas of national importance or require substantial 
improvements in revenue collection. These politicians believe that for a 
developing economy like Uganda that is still struggling to reach adequate levels 
of tax revenue collection, financing social protection programmes would be 
extremely challenging (Lwanga-Ntale, 2008). In a scoping report commissioned 
by the SPTF early in its existence, Devereux, Lwanga-Ntale and Sabates-Wheeler 
(2002: 7-8) state: 
 
‘…there is a tendency to dismiss social protection interventions as 
‘welfarist’ or ‘charity’, as though these programmes simply consume 
scarce public resources and are therefore ‘unaffordable’ in poor 
countries like Uganda. This is not our view. Instead, we believe that 
well designed and targeted social protection interventions can 
contribute both directly and indirectly to Uganda’s poverty reduction 
goals, and to the objectives of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan 
(PEAP).’ 
 
However, it appears clear that in recent years, there has been much greater support 
for social protection programmes. Below we will present evidence to this effect 
and explore in greater detail the factors that may have helped change the 
perceptions and attitudes of the stakeholders mentioned above and engendered 





5.2 Why has political support for social protection in 
general and cash transfers in particular increased 
since 2006? 
 
Political support for cash transfers has undeniable risen substantially in Uganda, 
especially since 2006. This confirmed by most of our key informants and is also 
evident from the evolution of policy, including the implementation of SAGE. 
 
Despite the fact that the government of Uganda has not been able to fully honour 
its counterpart financing obligations as per the Memorandum of Understanding 
signed with the Development Partners, the government has been able to allocate 
some funds for the SAGE programme. For example, in the financial year 2011/12, 
only USh 30 million of the USh 125m committed was released. In the financial 
year 2012/13, the Ministry of Finance allocated only USh 39.5 million. But in the 
financial year 2013/14 the Ministry of Finance allocated a total of USh 2 billion 
to the SAGE programme (ESP, 2013b). It has been revealed that the donors have 
expressed commitment to continue funding for the fourteen SAGE pilot districts 
and the rollout of core delivery systems across the country beyond 2015, although 
this will be dependent on the government’s commitment to provide counterpart 
funding during the pilot phase and extending the coverage of the senior citizen 
grant to more districts (ESP, 2013c). We can therefore conclude that fiscal 
commitments are starting to match the apparent rise in political commitment to 
cash transfers in Uganda.  
 
Table 1: Original commitment from GoU to financing SAGE 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
£20,030 £143,000 £540,800 £1,388,700 
Source: SAGE MoU, cited in Cammack and Twinamatsiko (2013). 
 
 
The rest of this section will discuss the factors that we identify as having 
contributed to rising political support for cash transfers. 
 
 
5.2.1 Donor and bureaucratic advocacy 
 
Grebe (2014a) argues that donors, primarily DFID, promoted, but initially failed 
to secure sufficient domestic political support for cash transfers to progress 
beyond ‘getting them on the agenda’. From the early 2000s, donors managed to 
team up with supportive social development bureaucrats as advocates of social 
protection policy reform and cash transfers. This bureaucratic ‘buy-in’ was an 
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essential contributor to the increasing centrality of cash transfers in the 
development agenda and securing political support for the eventual 
implementation of a substantial cash transfer pilot scheme. Grebe further argues 
that the approval and relatively successful implementation of the SAGE pilot, and 
the fact that a national tax-funded non-contributory pension was firmly on the 
political agenda by 2013, reflected not only donor influence, but—crucially—also 
the success of social development bureaucrats in constructing a supportive 
coalition comprising sections of the bureaucracy (including some finance and 
planning technocrats), civil society organisations, and political leaders in the 
legislature and executive. 
 
It is undeniable that donor preferences have been a substantial factor in the 
development of social protection policy in Uganda. DFID was the primary 
proponent of cash transfers among the ‘development partners’, while the World 
Bank and European Union supported substantial development programmes in 
Northern Uganda (described earlier) that included some social protection 
measures. 
 
The World Bank was, at the time of this research, conducting a social protection 
sector review and was expected to back cash transfers, although it was perceived 
as being ‘late to the party’ and not necessarily having much to offer. Some 
respondents worried that it would impose its preference for conditional cash 
transfers, potentially upsetting the finely crafted coalition in favour of social 
pensions. UNICEF had a strong preference for child-targeted grants, but 
strategically supported SAGE in the hope that the wide acceptance of the SCG 
would help create the political space for other categorically-targeted cash transfers 
in future. A grant targeting orphans and vulnerable children was not seen as 
politically feasible in the near future.26 
 
Donor influence was further evident in development policy-making at the national 
level, where donors have been closely integrated within the national policy 
processes. Donors have shaped the politics of social protection in Uganda through 
both their financial leverage and agenda-setting powers. As described earlier, 
DFID was a driving force behind the Social Protection Task Force (SPTF): DFID 
funded and exerted substantial influence over the design of SAGE, it funded study 
trips aimed at changing attitudes among policy-makers. Donors have also 
supported studies and conferences to provide evidence on the need for social 
protection. Most importantly, ESP and SAGE are primarily donor-funded. 
 
 
                                           
26 Interviews, Wilbroad Ngambi and David Stewart (31/01/2014). 
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5.2.2  Civil society and domestic political advocacy 
 
CSOs in Uganda have played a significant role in pressurising the government to 
take up social protection programmes to target the different categories of poor and 
vulnerable persons in the country. It should be noted, however, that political space 
for civil society to influence policy in Uganda is constrained by a relatively 
repressive state (see Grebe, 2014b), and that at least one knowledgeable informant 
(DFID’s Social Protection Advisor) has described civil society as a relatively 
weak force in social protection policy-making.27 CSOs have nevertheless 
expended significant efforts on lobbying, campaigns and engagement with 
different stakeholders (including politicians) and have received substantial donor 
support to do so (see Grebe, 2014a). They may have exerted substantial influence 
on the policy agenda through these efforts, but probably not through direct 
political activism. 
 
CSOs such as Development Research and Training (DRT) implemented various 
approaches including ‘co-option’. Key officials both in the MFPED and the 
MGLSD were identified as focal persons and continuously engaged not only to 
promote DRT’s agenda on chronic poverty and social protection, but also to act 
as channels to engage their political leadership within the ministries on the 
benefits of addressing chronic poverty through social protection. Furthermore, 
DRT identified the ‘movers and shakers’ of policy-making such as the permanent 
secretary of the MFPED. Through these engagements, DRT was able to create an 
interface with the key stakeholders, an approach that helped diffuse the tensions 
resulting from the contentious politics of lobbying and exerting pressure (Onapa, 
2010). 
 
A senior civil society figure argued that government and civil society have a much 
more productive relationship in this area of policy than in most,28 but the objective 
evidence that civil society lobbying has had a decisive impact is limited. DFID 
considers these organisations an important ally, but their social development 
advisor in Uganda described civil society activities on social protection as ‘quite 
weak’.29 It is also notable that the civil society organisations active on social 
protection are almost exclusively elite-based and there is little to no popular 
political mobilisation in demand of cash transfers or other forms of social 
protection. 
 
CSOs have been very active on a number of committees and platforms where they 
have been able to advocate and lobby for social protection programmes. The 
                                           
27 Interview, Rachel Waterhouse (13 January 2014). 
28 Interview, Alfred Nuamanya Buhitsya (30 January 2014). 
29 Interview, Rachel Waterhouse (13 January 2014). 
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participation of the CSOs on social protection committees dates back to the 
SPTF’s foundation in 2002. As described earlier, the SPTF was later transformed 
into a Social Protection Sub-Committee of the Social Development Sector 
Working Group with representation of CSOs, key ministries, research institutions, 
and donor representatives (Lwanga-Ntale, 2008). This sub-committee is the main 
leadership structure within the Government of Uganda on all social protection 
policy-related issues and is responsible for initiating and leading on all social 
protection policy development, reform and coordination on behalf of the 
Government of Uganda. The SPTF’s efforts in influencing social protection were 
first evident during the revision of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) 
in 2003-04, where it made proposals for strengthening the social capital of the 
poor and enhancing social inclusion of vulnerable groups in the country’s 
mainstream development process. It is through this committee that CSOs have 
been most influential in creating greater awareness of and lobbying for social 
protection initiatives in the Uganda. 
 
The participation of the CSOs may have contributed to the integration of social 
protection in the 5th pillar of the third PEAP of 2004. Civil Society also 
participated in the development of the NDP, and produced a joint position paper 
titled Civil Society Input Into PEAP Revision and The Development of The 5-Year 
National Development Plan (2008-2012) – Social Protection for Uganda’s Most 
Vulnerable And Chronically Poor: Issues, Challenges and Options in January 
2008. This may have contributed to the prominence of social protection in the 
NDP. 
 
Furthermore, there are also administrative structures within the Expanding Social 
Protection (ESP) programme such as the Steering Committee headed by the 
Permanent Secretary of the MGLSD, with representation from the MFPED, the 
Ministry of Local Government, the National Planning Authority, the Office of 
Prime Minister, the Ministry of Public Service, the Uganda Local Governments 
Association, civil society, and development partners. This committee provides 
overall strategic guidance to the programme and civil society has been very active 
at influencing and advocating for the programme within this structure (ESP, 
2013a). 
 
DFID has supported the formation of the Uganda Social Protection Platform 
(USPP) through which CSOs have been able to advocate for social protection 
programmes, specifically the roll-out of the Senior Citizen Grant (SCG) 
nationally. Most of the advocacy work has been targeting politicians such as 
Members of Parliament (MPs) and Minister of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development to influence the prioritisation and allocation of more financial 
resources to the SAGE. The advocacy has been done through different approaches 
that include writing letters to the President and Minister of Finance, Planning and 
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Economic Development. In November 2014, a petition calling for the national 
roll-out of SCG was tabled for discussion and debate in Parliament by the 
Chairperson of the Uganda Parliamentary Forum on Social Protection. It was later 
forwarded for handling to the Parliamentary committee on Gender, Labour and 
Social Development. In 2014, the USPP engaged in a range of advocacy activities 
that included petitioning the Speaker of Parliament, district leaders and MPs, 
dialogues with political parties, engagement with the Uganda Local Government 
Association, and SAGE monitoring in selected districts. 
 
Platforms have not stopped with CSOs but (also with DFID support) a Uganda 
Parliamentary Forum on Social Protection has been formed. This body brings 
together Members of Parliament (MPs) with an interest in, and who support, 
social protection. The forum was launched early in 2014 and at the time of this 
research had over 40 members. The formation of such a forum that brings together 
members of parliament is an indication that social protection programmes (and 
specifically SAGE) had gained political acceptance in Uganda.  
 
During the launch of the Forum, the Speaker challenged MPs who are members 
of the Forum to ensure that they lobby for funding for social protection so that the 
SCG is rolled out as a national social pension. The speaker said that “all older 
persons in all districts around the country deserve the grants and there is need to 
ensure that a budget is allocated to cover all senior citizens in all the districts of 
the country”.30 A number of MPs have called for the allocation of more funds to 
the SAGE programme. For example, early in 2014, during a press conference held 
at Parliament, the Chairperson of the Uganda Parliamentary Forum on Social 
Protection said that “We want a national roll out so that all elder persons can 
benefit from this money. Only 14 districts out of 112 districts are benefitting, 
which is a small number. This money is spent on health care, building houses and 
supporting the elderly people”.31 
 
 
5.2.3 Evolving arguments in favour of cash transfers 
 
Cash transfers have increasingly been presented as a ‘developmental intervention’ 
by its proponents. Social protection is increasingly presented as a necessary 
complement, rather than an alternative, to investment in the productive sectors of 
the economy. Anecdotal evidence that the SAGE grants have helped revitalise the 
local economy in pilot districts are frequently cited. Tellingly, when speaking 
                                           
30 Audio Recording of speech delivered at launch of the Uganda Parliamentary Forum on 
Social Protection. A report on the launch is also available at: 
http://www.socialprotection.go.ug/Parliamentary%20Forum%20on%20Social%20Protection
%20launched.pdf 
31 Audio recording of press conference. 
39 
 
about the impacts of SAGE, ESP officials and other supporters of the programme 
(including MPs) frequently mention reports that some beneficiaries have pooled 
pay-outs in informal saving schemes from which loans are then taken to purchase 
productive assets like livestock. Evidence of these schemes among beneficiaries 
is largely anecdotal, but it appears to be used both as a powerful rhetorical device 
to counter the notion that beneficiaries ‘waste’ cash ‘hand-outs’, and to show that 
cash transfers can contribute to development. Similarly, results of ‘exit surveys’ 
of beneficiaries’ expenditure patterns that show ‘non-wasteful’ and productive 
spending is seen as powerful evidence in favour of the programme. The MGLSD 
emphasises four economic impacts of SAGE: (1) increased household 
productivity through investment in agriculture and small business enterprises, (2) 
increased savings and investment in higher-risk ventures, (3) large numbers of 
savings and loans groups among beneficiaries, and (4) increased demand for local 
goods and services (Okillan, 2014). 
 
For example, Beatrice Okillan, in her presentation to MPs at the launch of the 
Parliamentary Forum, emphasised the use of money received through SAGE to 
buy productive assets such as livestock (Okillan, 2014). Social protection came to 
be presented as a necessary complement, rather than an alternative, to investment 
in the productive sectors of the economy. Some evidence of success in making 
this argument is provided by the fact that even a recent Poverty Status Report 
published by the Finance Ministry argued that addressing household vulnerability 
was essential for economic development, especially by enabling households to 
make riskier investments (MFPED, 2012). In the report’s foreword it was stated 
that: 
 
‘Convincing evidence is presented that the transformation process is 
well underway—there has been dramatic growth and diversification of 
the non-agricultural economy. … Uncertainty deters investment… The 
new evidence in this report (both quantitative and qualitative) illustrates 
the importance of microeconomic stability—the volatility at the level of 
the household’ (MFPED, 2012: i). 
 
 
5.2.4 Rise of the ‘inclusive development’ agenda 
 
During the fieldwork for this research, interviews with key informants indicated 
a growing acceptance that certain sections of the population were unlikely to 
benefit much (at least in the short to medium term) from economic development. 
The phrase ‘inclusive development’ was in wide use, with cash transfers seen as 
one way to ensure that the most marginalised are not left entirely out of the 
development process. Despite the move away from a focus on poverty reduction, 
there appeared to be wider acceptance that investment in infrastructure and private 
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sector development would most benefit those of working age and in regions where 
economic activity is not restricted to agriculture. This may help to explain why 
cash transfers to the aged were more widely accepted, while even among some of 
the strongest supporters of social protection cash transfers continued to be 
considered inappropriate for other groups. As Sarah Nahalamba (Senior Planner 
in the National Planning Authority) put it: 
 
‘We have changed our development paradigm to focus on growth. But 
of course, inclusive growth is something we are pushing forward. 
Because inclusive growth means poverty issues have to be addressed. 
You may have growth that is not inclusive. … That is why we are so 
interested in some of these social policies [like cash transfers] that can 
help us strike a balance between economic growth and social welfare. 
… [For these reasons] we have integrated social protection into the 
national planning framework’ (Interview, 20 January 2014). 
 
 
5.2.5 Increasing familiarity with and improved evidence for 
the feasibility efficacy of cash transfers 
 
Research and information provision: In order to change policy-makers’ mind-sets 
as well as provide more information about social protection and its importance in 
developing countries such as Uganda, both the Social Protection Secretariat and 
CSOs like DRT have organised workshops targeting different stakeholders with 
different messages. These meetings have been backed up with the production of 
various advocacy materials including policy briefs, discussion papers, 
information, education, and communication materials, as well as research reports 
on the impacts of SAGE. For example, when some politicians were saying that 
social protection is a western-driven agenda, DRT and Cross Cultural Foundation 
of Uganda (CCFU) undertook a joint study in 2007 on “Culture and Social 
Protection for the poor in Uganda” to demonstrate that social protection is not a 
foreign concept but rooted within Uganda’s traditional systems and practices 
(cited in Onapa, 2010). Other studies which were aimed at providing evidence and 
information on the need for social protection in Uganda included “Social 
Protection in Uganda: A call for Action”, by DRT (Onapa, 2010). In order to 
attract wider attention to social protection issues, DRT carried out a series of 
workshops in the different regions of Uganda targeting district politicians, 
technocrats and CSO representatives. The intention was to create knowledge and 
an understanding on social protection through provision of information as well as 
stimulating debates and demand for social protection initiatives. In addition, 
CSOs provided information to the government through the Civil Society Issues 
Paper on social protection to inform the design of National Development Plan, 




Donors and CSOs have organised a number of conferences to provide evidence 
on successful social protection schemes and its affordability in developing 
countries. These include the most recent regional conference on “Financing Social 
Protection in East and Central Africa: Learning from experience” held in October 
2013. It was organised by DRT and the Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC) 
at Makerere University, with support from the Think Tank Initiative at 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung (FES). The purpose of the conference was to stimulate discussion and 
learning about various options of financing of social protection programmes 
particularly in low income countries, especially in Eastern and Central Africa. The 
conference was attended by delegates including social protection experts from a 
range of countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Mauritius, South Africa and 
Malawi. Experiences were shared on what has worked in each of these countries. 
Previous conferences include the First International Conference on Social 
protection for the Poorest in Africa that was organised by DRT in partnership with 
the Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC), Brookes World Poverty Institute 
(BWPI), the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Swiss 
Development Cooperation, and UNICEF. This conference was aimed at 
furthering learning on social protection. It targeted a number of stakeholders 
including politicians and government institutions such as the MGLSD and 
MFPED. 
 
Study trips for politicians and technocrats: In a bid to create understanding of 
social protection and its importance, a number study trips to other countries where 
social protection programmes have been successfully implemented have been 
carried out. These were aimed at building increased political will. DFID funded a 
study tour for key government officials to Malawi in order to observe the 
Mchinjiji Cash Transfer project in 2007. This exposure increased the appreciation 
of, and interest in, social protection among delegates, who are reported to have 
become important advocates of cash transfers in Uganda (Onapa, 2010). 
 
The Social Protection Secretariat has also organised study trips in order to build 
political support. For example, in November 2011 a Uganda delegation 
comprising six cabinet members and two MPs visited South Africa and Lesotho 
to learn about the direct income support programmes in the two countries. On 
return from the study trip, one of the delegates said that “the government of 
Uganda should prioritise direct income support to older persons and commit to 
immediate but phased scale up of SAGE” (ESP, 2013a). In February 2014, the 
Social Protection Secretariat organised another study trip to Mauritius and South 
Africa for politicians, to increase understanding of the strategic importance of 
direct income support—a key social protection instrument, and how it has 
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contributed to the development of those two countries. The delegates included 
Ministers and senior officials from a range of departments.32 
 
 
5.2.6 Improved institutional capacity 
 
Training conducted by key stakeholders such as the Social Protection Secretariat 
has also helped increase domestic political support for the SAGE pilot programme 
in Uganda.  
 
Leadership capacity development activities have been carried out at various 
levels, from national to district and local government levels. A significant amount 
of training has been conducted for different stakeholders, both inside government 
and outside, for the purposes of implementation and monitoring of the 
programme. In the wider government, people have been trained across the 
ministries and these training activities have attracted high-level officers, 
Permanent Secretaries, Directors, Commissioners, and Assistant Commissioners. 
Others have attended a special course conducted by the Economic Policy 
Research Institute (EPRI) based in Cape Town, South Africa.  
 
The Social Protection Secretariat has developed a course conducted locally, called 
‘Social Transfers: Policy and Programming in Uganda’. This course is intended 
to significantly expand the number of Ugandan officials who have received 
comprehensive training in the key social protection policy issues in Uganda. For 
example in December 2011, the first session of the course attracted over 42 
participants from various government departments. The training was conducted 
by the Social Protection Secretariat in conjunction with the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD), and delivered by Development Pathways, a 
group of experienced international development practitioners specialising in the 
social protection field and social development (ESP, undated web page). 
  
                                           
32 The delegation comprised Hon. Mary Karooro Okurut, Minister of Gender, Labour and Social 
Development, Hon. Richard Todwong, Minister for political Mobilisation, Office of the 
president, Hon. Rose Namayanja, Minister of Information and National Guidance, Hon. 
Sulaiman Madada, Minister of State for Gender, Labour and Social Development in charge of 
Elderly and Disability affairs, Hon. Margaret Komuhangi, Member of Parliament, and the 
Chairperson Parliamentary Committee on Gender, Labour and Social Development. Other 
members of the team included Mr. Pius Bigirimana, Permanent Secretary-Ministry of Gender, 
Labour and Social Development, Mr. Kenneth Mugambe, Director of  Budget, Ministry of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development, Mr. Daniel Graymore, Head of Office, DFID 
Uganda, Mr. Donal Cronin-Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy of Ireland, Mr. Stephen Kasaija-Head, 
Social Protection Secretariat, Ministry of Gender Labour & Social Development, among others.  
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Training has also targeted politicians, especially at the local government level. 
These include the chairpersons and councillors at various levels—district, sub-
county, parish, and village level (ESP, 2013b). This was done because local 
political leaders play an important role in overseeing and supporting development 
activities within their districts. SAGE has engaged the political leaders in carrying 
out monitoring activities. Furthermore, the district SAGE support unit shares 
regular performance reports with the district political leadership through the Chief 
Administrative Officer (CAO). Work plans, budgets, and minutes of the quarterly 
SAGE programme management meetings are also copied to the district 




5.2.7 Electoral politics 
 
Public demand and the perceived electoral advantages of supporting the pilot and 
its expansion also appeared to play a role in rising political support. The SAGE 
pilot was widely seen by informants (including Members of Parliament) as an 
extremely popular programme that had greatly enhanced the visibility of the 
government in the remote and rural communities where many beneficiaries live. 
Many informants attributed the growing political support for the pilot—especially 
in Parliament—to politicians noticing its popularity and potential as a vote-
winner. Some MPs argued that it would be ‘political suicide’ to oppose the 
programme in interviews. In fact, the NRM, the Forum for Democratic Change 
(the official opposition), and the Uganda People’s Congress all included 
commitments to social pensions in their election manifestos for the 2011 election, 
with the FDC even including the specific commitment of doubling the size of the 
monthly payment.33 Social pensions were seen as popular not only among direct 
beneficiaries, but also among those on whom old age poverty creates a burden: 
communities and kin (especially children) who are traditionally expected to 
support the elderly.34 Many respondents cited the 2016 election cycle as a factor 
working in favour of the pilot and of the potential national rollout of a social 
pension, since politicians would be looking to claim credit for successful and 
visible interventions, and the pilot comes at relatively low cost. 
 
However, the literature on electoral politics in Uganda suggests a less neat link 
between electoral pressure and ‘popular’ or ‘vote-winning’ policies. Neither 
President Museveni (in the competitive presidential elections since 1996) nor the 
                                           
33 The NRM’s election manifesto states that “The NRM Government will roll out the cash 
transfer program for older persons” (NRM, 2010: 41) and the FDC’s that it “will pay USh 
50,000 per month to persons over 65 years” (FDC, 2010: 20). The UPC’s also commits to a 
national social pension (UPC, 2010). 
34 Interview, Joseph Mugisha-Bitature (27 January 2014) 
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NRM (in multiparty legislative elections since 2006) have faced a serious 
electoral threat from opposition parties. Rakner and Helle (2013) argue that the 
low level of urbanisation in Uganda has allowed the incumbent party to 
effectively use the ‘authoritarian tools’ at its disposal during the 2011 election (in 
contrast to Zambia, which saw similar levels of opposition mobilisation and where 
the opposition in fact won the election). As Gibb (2012: 460) points out, in the 
2011 Presidential election Museveni attracted only a slightly greater percentage 
of the vote than the Afrobarometer survey suggested he should—showing that the 
President truly is popular among the voting population, especially rural voters. 
Furthermore, the only contests marked by serious violence and repression were 
those during NRM primaries for party candidacies and the mayoral election in 
Kampala (won by an opposition candidate)—pointing, according to Gibb (2012: 
461), to the importance of primary elections in a system where a single party 
dominates government decisions and patronage networks. This chimes with 
Golooba-Mutebi and Hickey’s (2013) description of the political settlement in 
Uganda as a ‘dominant president form’ with increasing ‘competitive clientalist 
tendencies’, if the competitive dimension of clientalism is seen as occurring 
primarily within the ruling party. They further suggest that this can result in pro-
poor outcomes, as political competition (whether electoral or over patronage 
benefits) may create incentives for politicians to be seen to support pro-poor and 
pro-rural policies—as cash transfers are. Stasavage’s (2005) analysis of the 1996 
Presidential election suggest that even in the absence of a significant challenge to 
Museveni, Uganda’s move to Universal Primary Education (UPE)—and 
associated massive increases in expenditure on primary education—can indeed be 
linked to democratic politics, but that it depended on the salience of education as 
an issue and the public’s access to information about UPE.  
 
The move to multiparty democracy may have been driven primarily by internal 
factional conflicts within the NRM, coupled with constitutional changes designed 
to safeguard the power of the Executive and the central political leadership 
(Makara et al., 2009). Repression of political opposition continues in Uganda 
(Izama and Wilkerson, 2011)—allegations of systematic human rights violations 
are common (see Human Rights Watch, 2011) and Freedom House has 
consistently rated civil and political rights poorly35—which makes an opposition 
victory extremely unlikely. Nevertheless, the impact of electoral politics cannot 
be entirely discounted. Read as a whole, the somewhat contradictory literature on 
electoral politics in Uganda suggests that even in the context of Museveni and the 
NRM being assured of an election victory in 2016, if old age poverty becomes a 
sufficiently salient issue, and it is judged electorally advantageous by NRM 
                                           
35 Freedom House political rights and civil liberties ratings for Uganda varied between 4 and 6 
since 1986 and stood at 6 and 4 respectively in 2014. Ratings are on a 7-point scale with 1 
representing most free and 7 least free. Uganda was classified as ‘partly free’ throughout the 
period (Freedom House, 2014). 
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candidates to support a social pension in competitive primaries (or in the actual 
elections in those constituencies that are genuinely competitive), electoral forces 
may well favour the introduction of such a social pension. Judging by newspaper 
coverage of old age poverty and the SAGE pilot, the public salience and access to 
information about old age poverty and the social pension appears to be rising—
although rigorous evidence of this is lacking. 
 
A number of politicians have been quoted saying that the SAGE programme is 
safe and expansion likely because of the NRM Manifesto commitment to older 
persons. This was evident during a visit to Kiboga (one of the SAGE pilot 
districts) by the previous Minister of Gender, Labour and Social Development—
(ESP, 2013c). The SAGE programme has recently gained political support in 
different ways within the NRM. For example, following the successful setup of 
delivery systems and processes in Kaberamaido, Kiboga, and Kyenjojo district, 
the programme was officially launched by Vice President Edward Kiwanuka 
Ssekandi on behalf of the President in October 2011. In March 2012, Museveni 
himself launched the programme in Nebbi district (ESP, 2013b). Several 
politicians have been seen participating in the launch of the SAGE programme in 
pilot districts. These include the Prime Minister, Amama Mbambazi, who made 
the first payment of the Senior Citizen Grant in Kyankwanzi district in October 
2012. 
 
Some politicians have praised both the implementation and the impact of the 
SAGE programme. For example, during a visit to Nebbi—one of the pilot SAGE 
districts in July 2013 the Minster of Gender, Labour and Social Development, 
Mary Karooro Okurut, said: 
 
‘I am impressed by the work done by SAGE in Nebbi district. I have 
seen from my interaction with beneficiaries that they are putting the 
money they receive to good use. As government, we are committed to 
ensuring that the programme goes ahead and is scaled to other districts 
in the country’ (ESP, 2013c). 
 
A national social pension (usually framed as a national rollout of the SCG) is 
firmly on the political agenda in Uganda. In August 2013 the President of Uganda 
directed the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development to expand the 
programme to Yumbe district. To respond to the President’s directive, the 
Ministry decided to use the USh 2b that was allocated in the 2013/14 financial 
year as counterpart funding by the government to implement the programme in 
the fifteenth district. Recent evidence from Yumbe district indicates that 
preparations for the rolling out of the Senior Citizen Grant are progressing. 
According to a Yumbe District Community Development Officer, the local 
council leaders and key stakeholders had been trained in the operational 
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modalities of the programme, beneficiaries had already been identified (ESP, 
2013c), and the first payments were made in August 2014 (ESP, 2014). 
 
Most significantly, the President of Uganda has also directed the MGLSD and 
MFPED to jointly develop a national roll-out plan for the Senior Citizen Grant 
and to publish the agreed roll-out plan in the media. In response to the President’s 
directive, the two ministries carried out a study ‘Cost and Financing Options on 
affordability of the national Senior Citizen Grant’ to complement the existing 
financing options study (Cammack and Twinamatsiko, 2013). It was concluded 
that the government of Uganda can afford to roll out the programme (Okillan, 
2014). The report indicates that the programme can be fully financed from 
projected increases in revenue alone and would cost a maximum of 6.88% of the 
annual revenue increase, dropping to only around 2% of the annual revenue 
increase from 2019/20 onwards. Therefore, the national roll-out of the programme 
could be implemented without the need for reallocating any existing expenditure 
or relying on development partners or borrowing. At full scale, the study 
concluded that a national senior citizen grant would cost only 2.09% of the total 
government expenditure and 3.76% of the recurrent expenditure (Cammack and 
Twinamatsiko, 2013). 
 
These emerging events seem to indicate that SAGE, and especially the national 
rollout of a social pension, is widely perceived as something that could provide 
significant political capital and electoral advantage. Given a widely-held 
perception that Government initiatives are credited to the NRM and even 
President Museveni himself, the claim of certain respondents that the President is 






The evolution of social protection in Uganda can be traced back to traditional 
cultural norms that included solidarity and assistance to people within clans, 
extended families, and broader society who were unable to look after themselves. 
Colonial and postcolonial social security systems largely left what we now call 
social protection for the poorest to kin and tribe, while a small elite of civil 
servants (and later formal sector workers) had access to social insurance.  
 
Only since the early 2000s has social protection gained in prominence as a tool 
for poverty eradication and inclusive development. We traced this slow evolution 
of development policy to embrace social assistance and cash transfers in order to 
demonstrate that substantial resistance existed amongst technocratic and political 
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elites and that these were to some extent overcome by the proponents of cash 
transfers. 
 
The sources of resistance to cash transfers (and social protection for the poorest 
more broadly) are varied and complex. That it existed is clear from donors’ failed 
attempts to implement large-scale programmes before the SAGE pilot started in 
2010. It is our contention that, in addition to legitimate concerns over the 
affordability and sustainability, the prevailing development ‘paradigm’ and 
‘discourse’, negative elite attitudes to and lack of familiarity with social 
assistance, as well as intra-governmental institutional politics probably played 
significant roles. This is an area that requires further research into the continuing 
resistance to cash transfers from some technocrats and political leaders in order to 
be fully understood. 
 
We further identified a number of potentially crucial factors that may help explain 
the substantially increased levels of political support for social protection for the 
poor, and cash transfers in particular, that can be observed from the mid-2000s 
onwards and especially since the implementation of SAGE started. Our 
informants were nearly unanimous that there had been a massive change in the 
attitudes of policy-makers and politicians. There is sufficient evidence to conclude 
that donor and bureaucratic advocacy (see also Grebe, 2014a), civil society 
advocacy and supportive politicians, and evolving arguments in favour of, and 
increased evidence on, the efficacy and affordability of cash transfers have 
positively and substantially impacted on the political appetite for social protection 
for the poor, and cash transfers in particular. It is harder to substantiate that 
electoral politics has been an important driver of the increased domestic political 
support, although we believe the indications are strong that this has been an 
important factor. 
 
Unfortunately, weighing up the relative importance of these political factors and 
forces is not possible using the available data. We are also not currently in a 
position to compare Uganda to similar Sub-Saharan African countries in order to 
shed further light on these political factors (for example by identifying the ways 
in which it has been typical and exceptional). Further research is required in order 
to form a more comprehensive understanding of the political drivers of domestic 
political support for social protection and cash transfers. The factors identified in 
this paper, while treated somewhat speculatively, are nevertheless a useful starting 
point to inform this broader research agenda. 
 
It is further worth noting that while the evidence presented in this paper has 
demonstrated fairly conclusively that political support for social protection (which 
includes social assistance in the form of cash transfers to the poorest) has been 
rising, the broader development policy discourse is still dominated by an 
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‘economic growth and prosperity’ agenda, and it appears that public investment 
in infrastructures such as roads and electrification may well be a greater priority. 
This is reflected in the National Development Plan and the rhetoric emanating 
from senior figures in the Executive, including the President himself, which leaves 
investment in social protection as a far lower priority. 
 
We conclude, therefore, that it is too early to proclaim that donor, civil society, 
and bureaucratic advocacy, or other political factors such as increasing awareness 
of international evidence and perceived electoral advantages, have resulted in a 
reorganisation of developmental priorities in Uganda. The future of social 
protection programmes depend on political and fiscal commitments that have not 
yet been demonstrated. We can merely say that social protection has attracted 
significantly higher levels of political support in recent years than in the past, and 
that future investment in large-scale social assistance has become more likely than 
at any previous point in Uganda’s history. 
 
 
Appendix: Timeline of key policy developments 
(1986-2014) 
 
1986: NRM/Museveni regime comes to power 
1987: Package of structural adjustment reforms agreed with IMF 
1992: MFPED established after merger 
1992: Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks introduced 
1993: Initiation of a privatisation programme 
1993: Decentralisation of service delivery 
1995: Etandwikwa programme (micro-credit scheme) 
1995: Consultative Group meeting in Paris 
1995: National Task Force on Poverty Eradication 
1996: Museveni pledges Universal Primary Education 
1996: Presidential election 
1997: Poverty Eradication Action Plan (1st version) 
1998: Uganda Participatory Poverty Assessment Project 
1999: Vision 2025 
1999: 1st Poverty Status Report 
1999: PEAP revision initiated 
2000: UPPAP report & 2nd phase 
2000: PEAP draft 1st revision recognised as Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
          by World Bank & IMF 
2001: Poverty Eradication Action Plan 2001-2003 (1st revision) 
2001: Presidential election 
2001: 2nd Poverty Status Report 
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2002: Social Protection Task Force established 
2003: 3rd Poverty Status Report 
2004: Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2nd revision) 
2005: WB Board accepts 2nd revision of PEAP 
2006: General election (presidential & multiparty parliamentary) 
2006: Transformation of Social Protection Task Force into the Social Protection  
          Sub-committee in the Social Development Sector Working Group 
2007: Proposed cash transfer pilot (blocked by Minister of Finance) 
2010: National Development Plan 2010/1-2014/5 
2010: Expanding Social Protection Programme (ESP) approved by Cabinet 
2011: Launch of the 2nd Social Development Sector Strategic Investment Plan  
          (SDIP 2) 2011/12-2015/16  
2011: General election (presidential & multiparty parliamentary) 
2011: SAGE transfers initiated under ESP 
2012: First draft of Social Protection Policy Framework 
2013: Vision 2040 
2013: Third draft of Social Protection Policy Framework 
2013: Draft rollout plan for national SCG prepared by MGLSD 
2014: Draft rollout plan for national SCG publicly presented by MGLSD (Feb.) 
2014: Uganda Parliamentary Forum for Social Protection launched (Feb.) 
2014: Draft second National Development Plan (2015/16-2019/20) produced 
2014: Senior Citizen Grant launched in Yumbe District by the Minister of  
          Finance (Oct.) 
2014: Chairperson of the Uganda Parliamentary Forum for Social Protection 
         presents a petition to roll out the SCG in Parliament (Nov.) 
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